Page 8 - MEOG Week 07

MEOG PoLICy MEOG
Drilling and challenges in the East Med
east med
LAST week, Turkey bought its third drillship for nearly $40mn as tensions regarding gas explora- tion in the Eastern Mediterranean heat up. hav- ing bought the first two vessels from Norway, Turkey purchased the “Sertao” drillship from the UK for much less than its market price.
The predicted market value of Sertao was around $120mn, but Port Talbot officials in the UK wanted a quick sale, as the ship had been sitting unsold in the Welsh town for nearly two years. The drillship was built by Samsung in South Korea. The vessel had been used by Brazil’s Petrobras between 2012 and 2015.
The Marshall Island-flagged drillship has a length of 227 metres, a width of 42 metres and a draft of 12 metres, and can reach down to 11,400 metres of depth and drill at 3,000 metres. Since spring 2019, when Ankara sent two drilling vessels – the Fatih and the Yavuz – to the East- ern Mediterranean, work has been ongoing in the region. Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration have opposed Turkey’s moves in the Mediterranean and have threatened to arrest the drillships’ crews, enlisting EU lead- ers to also condemn Turkey’s activities. Turkey has consistently contested the Greek Cypriot administration’s unilateral drilling in the East- ern Mediterranean, asserting that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) also has rights to the resources in the area.
These moves came at a time when President Akinci’s Northern Cyprus government – which is dependent on Turkey, but has a different, secu- lar, democratic and plural heritage – has engaged in a war of words with Turkey, stating that he did not want his island state to be subsumed into a greater Turkey. he may be referring to recent initiatives from Ankara, including a campaign of creeping Islamic influence, characterised by mosque building, the establishment of Koranic schools and the removal of evolution from the curriculum. A full-blown Turkish military take- over of the north of the island is unlikely but not impossible; Akıncı was quoted as saying that the prospect of Crimea-style annexation was “horri- ble” and against Turkey’s own interests.
A peace deal on Cyprus might smooth rising regional tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, the president suggested. Last summer Akıncı proposed that Greek and Turkish Cypriots should co-operate over oil drilling activities, sharing revenue from hydrocarbon discoveries. But the Greek Cypriot government has rejected a proposal from Ankara for all sides to cease exploration until a settlement is reached, saying this contravenes international law.
Turkey has steadily intensified its efforts over the past year to claim recently discovered deposits of natural gas in the Eastern Mediter- ranean. Maritime laws include some ambiguous elements regarding borders and “exclusive eco- nomic zones” (EEZs) extending from the shore- line of maritime states, and Ankara has been
attempting to use these ambiguities to forcefully assert its claim to almost half the Mediterranean. Most recently, Turkey signed an agreement with one of the warring administrations in Libya that unilaterally divided much of the Mediterra- nean between the two countries. Ankara’s deal with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) drew a diagonal line from Libya’s continental shelf and waters to Turkey’s, with the latter claiming the waters east of the line right up
to the coast of Cyprus and beyond.
The delimitation of “exclusive territorial
waters” ignored and displaced recognised claims by Cyprus and Greece. Turkey claimed this was legal because, in contrast to the EU and the UN, it did not recognise islands (such as the Greek islands and Cyprus) as being entitled to territo- rial waters beyond their immediate coastline. Following its distinctive interpretation of mar- itime laws, Turkey was one of only four coun- tries that failed to sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. Ankara can therefore now claim that it shares a maritime border with Libya and Egypt and completely ignore Greece’s maritime border with Cyprus.
In return for the maritime borders deal with the Libyan GNA and the right to drill in Libyan waters, Turkey has dispatched military aid to Tripoli. The Turkish support apparently included deployment of Syrian mercenary proxy forces that Turkey had also used in its incursions into northern Syria. The GNA in Tripoli is fight- ing a Tobruk-based rival government supported by Egypt and several other countries.
In Libya, Turkey is not only isolated but also confronting a bloc that consists of Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and France, and is a party to the military standoff between the Tripoli govern- ment and the rebel forces. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has accused Tur- key of violating the Berlin peace conference with its military aid to the GNA, since signatories had agreed to stay out of the Libyan civil war.
Over the past few months there have been several instances of confrontations or incursions involving the Turkish naval and air forces in the East Mediterranean, and with Greece, Israel, Cyprus and Egypt all ranged up in opposition to Turkey; France, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also lined up in the opposition camp, so Turkey is finding itself without any friends in its backyard. Turkey may well have some legitimate rights about its view that the East Mediterranean gas project is a threat to its own Turkstream gas pipeline, developed with Russia, and affects Tur- key’s proclaimed wish to be the energy hub of the area and the transit point of oil and gas headed for Europe. however, Turkey’s recent actions and statements suggest that it is not for changing course and further confrontations and difficul- ties may well lie ahead. Turkey may well have to learn to recognise other nations’ rights and to identify possible areas of mutual co-operation.™
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w w w. N E W S B A S E . c o m Week 07 19•February•2020