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Opinion
June 28, 2019 www.intellinews.com I Page 19
the GD has not done enough to develop the coun- try economically, accelerate democratic reforms or restored Georgia’s territorial integrity.
The GD record on these issues is no worse that of the UNM when they were in power, but that does not undercut the potency and validity of this view. Additionally, the UNM, and related parties, have consistently highlighted the role Ivanishvili has played in Georgia, painting him as the true leader of the country who governs capriciously despite holding no elected office. This line of attack is
not wildly inaccurate either. However, the rest
of the UNM assessment of the GD is a little less grounded in reality. Their insistence that Ivanish- vili is a Russian oligarch steering Georgia back to Moscow and towards becoming a dictatorship, or that elections are fraught with widespread fraud and are prima facie stolen are, at best, dramatic overstatements, and more usefully understood as overheated political rhetoric.
Thus, since leaving power at the end of 2012, the UNM has maintained its position as the second most powerful political force in the country while never being able to break out of that role both because of their radical approach to Georgian politics and the electorate’s reluctance to return to a period of UNM rule, whether by the UNM, European Georgia or some combination of the two. This means that the central dynamic of every recent election in Georgia has been the Georgian people choosing GD; not because they like them, but because GD is a bulwark against the UNM returning to power.
This is why despite demonstrable, and indeed demonstrated, dissatisfaction with the GD gov- ernment, the likely outcome of last week’s events will not be a transition of power, but a GD that is weaker and less effective remaining in power.
There are two things that could change this. First, if the UNM could step aside and allow this movement to be led by leaders from civil society and the like, the movement could gain even more momentum and could lead to bigger changes
in Georgia. However, from what we have seen over the last week or previously, it is unlikely that the UNM leadership would be content to
let that happen. If the UNM’s goal were to get the GD out of power, they would let Georgia’s strong civil society and the smattering of other political parties who are not broadly disliked and feared take the lead in anti-GD demonstrations, but if they did that than the UNM would be minimized. This shows us that deposing the GD and reinstating the UNM are goals that overlap partially, but not at all completely. It is also evident that the UNM only wants the former if
it brings about the latter.
Given that Ivanishvili has already conceded to pro- portional representation in the elections in 2020 with a zero per cent threshold – a concept that is a little vague as parties that get zero per cent of the vote should probably not get seats in parlia- ment – new elections, as a result of a movement not led by the UNM (if that were to come to pass) would open the door for many small parties to chip away at what has become a UNM hegemony of the opposition vote.
Therein lies the central paradox of the GD’s abil- ity to remain in power. Both the GD and the UNM benefit from the UNM being the second political force in the country. This allows the UNM to keep alive a hope of returning to power while simulta- neously remaining deeply involved in the politics and the governance of the country. However, it also helps the GD remain in power because in any election, or even any standoff in the streets, they can use fear of the UNM returning to power to mobilize support.
Another scenario, the one that should cause the most concern among the GD leadership, is that
if enough time goes by, the memory of the UNM period fades while age replacement takes its inevitable course, it is possible the GD’s ability to exploit the fear of a UNM return to power will stop working. If that were to happen, the UNM could return to power. That would almost certainly set off a period of intense conflict, instability and yet


































































































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