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Opinion
May 17, 2019 www.intellinews.com I Page 21
that allows seamless internet traffic. It gets us
to the webpages we type into our browser. It is also reliant on an international mix of levers
and pulleys to help it operate. Moscow wants
its own independent version to give it ultimate control over server access as well as the ability
to keep the internet running should it decide to isolate itself. This government managed DNS will, apparently, be operational by 2021.
All this is incredibly complicated and there is little detail out there on how Moscow intends to meet the inevitable challenges. Throughout the process the bill's authors showed limited tech knowledge and often failed to answer the most basic of questions. Concern over consequences for cross border traffic and interconnected services, as well as the risks of centralised management, have yet to be addressed. The procurement, installation and long-term maintenance of new equipment will be difficult and costly. And while the project will no doubt allow for lucrative, cost ballooning contracts for state-owned and Kremlin friendly businesses, it may also highlight what is an underfunded domestic tech industry.
Indeed, do not expect a Russian equivalent of Chi- na's 'Great Firewall' any time soon. Beijing is lead- ing the drive towards internet sovereignty because of decades of hard work with levels of resources and capabilities simply unavailable to Moscow. Bei- jing developed its censorship infrastructure in real- time, with China's population knowing little else. Moscow's accumulation of control is retrospective, with a population that has become accustomed to a (generally) free internet with access to staples of online culture like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, cloud services and messaging apps. If the financial costs could spiral, so could the political ones. The internet is embedded in much of Russian life and has produced a tech-savvy youth who will not give it up easily. So why is Moscow trying?
Securitisation
Since Putin's return to power in 2012 a narrative of 'fortress Russia' has dominated politics. Elevat- ing the state has allowed Moscow to legitimise
a cycle of securitisation across society, where enemies are generalised amalgamations of past and future threats. This brand of statism – hardly unique to Russia – creates a power dynamic that demands extraordinary measures to protect. It can be seen in the language used to justify the sovereign internet law on vague national security grounds as a defensive, pre-emptive act to shield Russia from foreign aggression.
But the new law has a lot more to do with threats from inside the country than out. The online world challenges the Kremlin's traditional interpretation of political control. While trust in television is in decline, affordable internet access across the country has grown as huge amounts of Russians use it to communicate, be entertained and informed. YouTube, which vies with the likes of Channel One for views, hosts Alexei Navalny's corruption investigations. Telegram channels are a haven for insider gossip and government leaks. And much like 2011/12, a host of social media platforms are used to organise anti-government demonstrations. The internet merges offline and online worlds in a way that is difficult to manage, let alone dictate and it terrifies the Kremlin.
We got a brief insight into the lengths Moscow
is willing to go to when, in October and March, mobile internet was cut during protests in Ingushetia. Replicating this across the whole
of Russia is another matter, however. Given the botched digital sledgehammer that was the Telegram ban and the poorly managed Yarovaya law, one can't help but feel Moscow has bitten off more than it can chew. A year on from the Telegram debacle, the service is still running and has more users than ever.
It's not just technical and political problems that Moscow may run into, but the international communications and tech firms already under pressure to comply with various strict laws. None are new to the censorship debate. Some, like Google and Apple, have fallen into line when it comes to, for example, data storage and localisation. Others, like Twitter and Facebook,