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shareholding in KGC, thereby shedding its stake in Centerra’s other interests, such as the Boroo mine in Mongolia. The talks over the restructuring continued stalling and facing setbacks until they eventually collapsed in December 2015.
Later on, in 2016, under then president Almazbek Atambayev, Kyrgyzstan launched a series of probes to assess the legality of 2003, 2004 and 2009 deals with Centerra amid another dispute over profit-sharing entwined with announcements of fines over supposed environmental damages. The dispute even led to arbitration proceedings.
Also in 2016, Kyrgyzaltyn voted against a planned $1.1bn purchase of Thompson Creek Metals (TCM) by Centerra to no avail. Centerra agreed to buy US-based
TCM as part of plans to reduce its dependence on Kumtor. It was that move that diluted Kyrgyzstan’s stake in Centerra to 26.28% from 32.7%.
The dispute eventually led to a deal
to affirm 2009 mine agreements, including tax and fiscal rules, in 2017. The company agreed to provide a one- time $50mn payment to a new Kyrgyz state-run nature development fund as well as annual payments of $2.7mn. The payments were framed as contingent on the government’s compliance with the agreement.
Under the deal, Centerra was also to
pay $10mn to a cancer care support fund and boost its payments to Kumtor’s reclamation fund to $6mn annually, until the payments covered an estimated reclamation cost of a minimum $69mn.
The years of 2018-2020 brought a brief period of relative stability in Kyrgyzstan’s relations with Centerra. That, of course, has by now been rudely interrupted.
Making the case
Yet everyone must be given a chance to make their case. The mine is a national treasure and the Japarov administration is apparently hoping to elaborate on its actions in meetings with international financial institutions called for the coming week.
This ultimately implies a measure of self-awareness on the part of top Kyrgyz officials, but that does not mean that the regime will not prove to have shot itself in the foot. And, if the consequences
of lost FDI eventually mount up to be particularly damaging, that analogy may need to be extended to the kneecap.
dangerous, storms with wind speeds of 16 to 28 metres per second. The storms left hundreds of people missing and claimed 10 confirmed casualties, including one child and nine adults. They also caused the loss of 1.6mn livestock.
As international headlines about the “apocalyptic” sandstorms and orange skies relayed, the storms swept across the border into China, pummelling
Alxa Right Banner in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Linze county in Gansu Province, with the effects felt as far away as Shandong Province and the Korean Peninsula.
Then, at the end of April, Mongolia and China were hit by second and third rounds of fierce sandstorms. In Mongolia, over 1mn livestock were killed in the first quarter of 2021, most of which died in the southwestern Mongolian province of Bayankhongor.
Human consequences
People who live in the affected areas tell how flying sand strips the paint from cars and scratches the glass. It turns over gers (yurts) and they roll away. “But, actually they are okay,” explains Enkh, “they can be rebuilt
A photograph taken from the International Space Station shows a massive sandstorm engulfing the Gobi Desert.
Mongolia’s apocalyptic sandstorms
Antonio Graceffo
In Mongolia, one trigger for the government to declare a disaster is
a wind speed that exceeds 24 metres per second. This occurred in mid-March, when the country’s largest sandstorm in a decade struck. In Uvurkhangai, Bulgan and Umnugovi provinces the wind speed reached from 18 to 34 metres per
second. The wind speed in Dundgovi province, was even higher, at 22 to 40 metres per second.
Other provinces, such as Govi-Altai, Bayankhongor, Arkhangai, Tuv, Khentii, Dornod, Sukhbaatar and Dornogovi experienced less severe, although still
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