Page 5 - FSUOGM Week 12
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FSUOGM COMMENTARY FSUOGM
KEY FACTS:
• US production costs are $23.55 per barrel for shale and $20.99 for non-shale.
• Russia’s cost is $19.21 per barrel.
• Saudi Arabia’s cost is $8.98 per barrel, but the kingdom’s budget is heavily dependent on profits from oil production.
sanctions against the Russian oil industry since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in early 2014. These measures include a ban on US companies assisting Russia on offshore Arctic, deepwater and unconventional oil projects and limits on the access of some Russian producers to inter- national financial markets.
Last month Washington also slapped sanc- tions on a Rosneft subsidiary that had been trading Venezuelan oil, helping to prop up the regime of President Nicolas Maduro. It sanc- tioned a second Rosneft unit earlier this month.
However, like the Obama administration before it, Trump’s White House has been reluc- tant to target Russian oil exports, fearing that doing so would plunge markets into chaos and escalate tensions with Moscow.
In December, a US senate panel passed the Defending American Security from Krem- lin Aggression (DASKA) bill, first drawn up a year and a half ago. Dubbed “the bill from hell,” it proposes drastic measures to bring Russia’s oil industry to a standstill, including a ban on businesses providing support valued at $5mn or more in a given year to a Russian oil project. This could be interpreted to cover oil purchases, which would jeopardise Russian exports.
DASKA is yet to pass either the US Senate or the house, and after that it would need to be signed into law by Trump. In this process it could undergo revision.
Possible other sanctions against Russia are in the works, sources told the WSJ. But details on the punitive measures are undisclosed.
Production costs
Saudi Arabia’s oil is much cheaper to produce than Russian and US supplies. Its production costs, including gross taxes, capital spending, extraction and transportation costs, are only $8.98 per barrel, according to Saudi Aramco’s IPO prospectus last year.
“In a nutshell, Saudi Aramco can sustain the verylowpriceandcansustainitforalongtime,” CEO Amin Nasser said in an earnings call on March 16.
While it was Russia’s actions that provoked Saudi Arabia to cut its prices, the kingdom’s main target is higher-cost US shale. US shale oil costs $23.35 per barrel, while non-shale oil costs $20.99, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Russia, in comparison, extracts oil at a cost of $19.21 per barrel.
On the face of it, this would suggest that Saudi Arabia is best positioned for a poten- tially prolonged market downturn. However, it needs an oil price of around $80 per barrel for its state budget to break even. Russia, in con- trast, can balance the books with oil at only $42 per barrel. The difference is partly due to Saudi Arabia’s greater reliance on oil revenues, and partly thanks to efforts by Moscow since the 2014 oil price crash to cut spending and boost tax income.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has accumu- lated more than $500bn in net foreign assets over
the years, helping to shield its public finances from weaker oil revenues.
Whether or not Russia or Saudi Arabia can withstand low oil prices for longer, US shale is certainly in a more precarious position. Chev- ron and ExxonMobil, which have both invested heavily in US shale in recent years, are expected to make dramatic cuts to expenditure. Canadian producers are in a similarly tough spot.
With oil demand in freefall as lockdowns are imposed across the world to slow the spread of the coronavirus, the losses from Russia and Saudi Arabia launching a war against their US competitors at this stage may outweigh any potential gain, however.
Demand destruction
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and OPEC have all revised down their oil demand forecasts for the year.
Both the EIA and IEA expect demand in the first quarter of this year to fall year on year – the first quarterly contraction in more than a dec- ade – with the former predicting a 910,000 barrel per day slide and the latter anticipating a 435,000 bpd contraction.
A major contributor to this drop comes from the world’s biggest crude importer, China, where COVID-19 originated.
Energy consultancy Wood Mackenzie said on March 23 that the country’s crude runs in Febru- ary had shrunk by 3.1mn bpd year on year on the back of weak demand and disruption caused by the pandemic. It projected that while the country might to take the opportunity to fill its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) with oil, with stock fill- ing reaching 300,000 bpd by the end of 2020, it would so at half the rate seen in previous years.
“Since the last oil price crash in 2014, China has been accelerating its crude imports for stra- tegic and commercial storage from about 200mn barrels in 2014 to 900mn barrels in 2019,” Wood Mackenzie senior consultant Lei Sun said. Sun noted that total stores could rise to 1.15bn barrels this year, equivalent to 83 days of oil demand.
The consultancy said crude imports for refin- ing and storage were anticipated to amount to around 9.5mn bpd in 2020, down 5% from about 10mn bpd in 2019.
Supply plans
As previously reported, Aramco plans to boost output to 12.3mn bpd in the coming months, from around 9.7mn bpd earlier this year, and eventually to 13mn bpd after investing in increased drilling. The kingdom will continue to reduce operations at its local refineries in April and May to free up volumes for exports, Reuters reported on March 19. Its oil ministry also said on March 17 it would boost gas output at the massive Fadhili processing complex, to provide more gas for power generation, so that around 260,000 bpd of oil can be made available for export.
In addition, Saudi Aramco may opt to release
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