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74 Opinion
bne April 2021
Ivanishvili quits again
There are all indications that the current crisis in the country will be a recurring one. In many ways the basis for this lies in the resignation of Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian billionaire and founder of GD. “I believe that my mission is accomplished,
so I’ve decided to step out of politics for good and fully give
up the reins of power,” said Ivanishvili in a letter that was released on January 11. He was replaced by Irakli Kobakhidze, who served as executive secretary of GD.
It is not Ivanishvili’s first departure. Several years back he did the same only to return to play an active part in the country’s chaotic political landscape. No wonder that there are many sceptics who question the seriousness of his decision. Many believe it is a ploy to continue governing the country from behind the scenes.
Ivanishvili created the Georgian Dream party before the 2012 parliamentary elections when Saakashvili’s UNM was defeated. Having presided over the party, Ivanishvili has dominated Georgia’s political landscape ever since.
“Ivanishvili created the Georgian Dream party before the 2012 parliamentary elections when Saakashvili’s UNM was defeated and he has dominated Georgia’s political landscape ever since”
In 2014, he founded the 2030 public movement, then the Citizen non-governmental organisation, however, in 2018 he formally returned to politics to become the chairman of GD. Ivanishvili’s resignation could have thus triggered critical changes not only to the fabric of the ruling party, but also to the balance of power between the political parties, namely it emboldened the opposition parties.
His resignation caused infighting among party leaders.
This was apparent in the unexpected resignation by Giorgi Gakharia, who refused to take part in the arrest of Melia. There are three strong groupings within the party: one around Tbilisi mayor Kakha Kaladze, the second around Kobakhidze, though he is politically unpopular among the population. The third is around the current PM Irakli Garibashvili with his so-called clan of Kakhetians (Kakheti is a region of Georgia).
The potential struggle will not be open and acrimonious,
at least at first. Each grouping will try to have its associates appointed to crucial government positions, win tenders for the biggest projects, etc. Eventually, the weakening of the power vertical in Georgian Dream will lead to internal crises
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and conflicts, which will be manifested first latently and then openly. Among them, there will be tendencies to rearrange interests and powers according to corruption/personal interests, which can manifest itself even at the institutional level, for example in the form of conflicts between different agencies or ministries.
Another factor leading to the weakening of GD is the non- existence of ideological ties, no consolidated political interests, and no real, living practice of political unity. Moreover, no long-term development of the country’s economy and political system is being proposed. The emphasis is still on portraying the UNM as a destructive political force, and not on actual reforms, for instance, in the judiciary, education or economic spheres.
One of the theories behind Kobakhidze’s appointment was Ivanishvili’s idea of having as many poles of political power as possible so that nobody could garner enough momentum to challenge his legacy and the working of the party.
The leaders of the three groupings are personally associated with Ivanishvili. His influence on them is lasting, which means that technically he would be able to influence overall developments within the party. It is exactly because of
this vertical of power that various sources familiar with the internal operation of the party claim that it is almost impossible to consider GD without Ivanishvili whether he is in charge or has relinquished de-jure political power.
Another possibility is that Ivanishvili has resigned for good. In fact, some logic could be seen in this thinking considering his political passivity in the last few years and the very difficult pre-election period. There are signs of a certain political fatigue and even frustration with the overall process of keeping the opposition at bay, fighting off Western criticism and keeping the economy afloat.
Pressure from the West
There is also a question of Western political pressure. Constant criticism of Georgia being run by a shadow figure often undermined expectations among Georgia’s foreign partners on the country’s democratic future. Rumours still swirl around in Tbilisi that Ivanishvili was likely to be targeted by US sanctions that would seriously constrain his actions and have a bearing on Georgia’s internal politics. His decision to quit for good could therefore be a permanent decision.
The timing of his resignation is also indicative of probable foreign pressure in this process. The elections held in October 2020 and won by GD are contested by the opposition spectrum. What is crucial in the negotiations held between the ruling party and opposition forces and moderated by ambassadors in Georgia is the West’s tacit support for GD. Many in Georgia believe this could have been an informal arrangement whereby the West approves of GD’s victory,
but in exchange Ivanishvili should have left, removing an important obstacle for Georgia-West relations.

