Page 7 - FSUOGM Week 41 2019

FSUOGM COMMENTARY FSUOGM
getting harder and harder,” he remarked. PdVSA has tried to find ways to overcome these challenges, and in some cases it has suc- ceeded. It has reportedly been working with Ros- neft, Russia’s largest oil operator, to move some of its production to markets around the world. And as Reuters reported last week, it resorted to using vessels from an ageing domestic fleet that had not departed from Venezuelan territorial waters for years to send crude and petroleum
products to Cuba.
These tactics may have a limited life span. The
domestic ships used to deliver fuel to Cuba are old enough that they will not be available indef- initely, and the US government is working to identify and penalise as many of PdVSA’s part- ners as possible. Just last month, for example, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said that his department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) had imposed sanctions on four com- panies involved in transporting crude oil and petroleum products from Venezuela to Cuba.
Under these circumstances, Cuba should not expect Venezuela to meet all of its needs – cer- tainly not every month, and not in full.
Russia to the rescue?
Meanwhile, Moscow is not exactly coming to the rescue either.
Medvedev did state last week that Russia wanted to help Cuba secure adequate supplies of fuel and develop its own oil and gas resources. But he did not say that the Kremlin was ready to offer any type of short-term relief or logisti- cal assistance. For example, when asked by the Rossiya-1 television channel whether Russian ships could escort tankers heading for the island state, he replied: “I think we will find other ways to help Cuba get oil and petroleum products.”
He also indicated that discussions between Moscow and Havana were still in the relatively early stages, without much in the way of concrete plans. “We discussed this today and agreed that
we would draft a work plan for energy supplies to Cuba, bearing in mind conventional energy sources, hydrocarbons and maybe some other available avenues,” he told Rossiya-1.
The prime minister and other Russian officials indicated that Moscow’s preferred approach was to continue participating in the development of Cuba’s upstream oil reserves. This is perhaps a logical approach, given that Cubapetroleo is already extracting enough crude from its own fields to cover 40% of domestic demand. But once again, it offers little relief in the short term. Exploration campaigns do not always succeed, and even when they do, oil operators usually need several years to bring new fields on stream.
Sanctions trump socialism
In short, Cuba is still in a precarious position, and its long-time allies Venezuela and Russia are not likely to provide any long-term fixes any time soon.
Indeed, Moscow has indicated that its will- ingness to help Havana is limited. While in Cuba last week, Medvedev downplayed the close ties that the island state had to the Soviet Union dur- ing the Cold War, hinting that Russia was not willing to prop up another country.
“The Soviet Union is no longer there, and Cuba is changing, and there’s no question about any free help which would then have to be writ- ten off,” he remarked. “All our relations are very pragmatic. Although they are friendly in nature and based on a historical past, they are never- theless relations between modern states. They should be mutually beneficial.”
Caracas, for its part, is likely to take a more friendly stance, especially in light of the ideo- logical similarities between the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. Even so, this will not necessarily take the form of concrete aid, since sanctions are making ships hard to find, even in the face of socialist solidarity.™
Medvedev (L) and Diaz- Canel (R) held talks in Havana.
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