Page 4 - Empowerment and Protection - Afghanistan

14,728 $718.6
NEARLY 150,000
NATO TROOPS
IN 2010
(WEINBAUM 2014:20)
the intervention in 2001. In 2013, the Human Development Index (HDI) report rated Afghanistan amongst fourteen other countries that had registered remarkable HDI gains of more than
two percent annually since 2000.7 In its 2010 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) review, the Afghan government highlighted major improvements in progress towards the MDGs that were seen in some areas, while in other areas little progress was made, particularly in tackling the
eradication of extreme poverty.
In Afghanistan, physical insecurity continues to remain a predominant and critical threat to human security, hindering the pace of development.
While student enrolment igures and the number
of primary schools have increased, the quality of education is substandard, and in most districts there are no education facilities beyond primary level. In addition, almost 230 districts do not have female teachers, creating serious barriers for female students, as families do not generally allow their daughters to attend co-education facilities in rural areas.9 While unemployment igures remain alarmingly high at
4 million, there are some signiicant improvements from 2001.10 The most effective poverty reduction strategies exist in countries that have gained a basic level of physical security. But in Afghanistan, physical insecurity continues to remain a predominant and critical threat to human security, hindering the pace of development.
a third of Afghans – mostly rural Afghans and Pashtuns – had sympathy for armed opposition groups, mainly the Taliban.3
The Taliban insurgency has been one factor impeding the central government’s ability to exercise its power and inluence over its citizens, especially in the periphery. The return of some warlordsa ousted by the Taliban, and the advent
of new power brokers formed by the civil war
has also fragmented authority across the country.4 Many warlords were military leaders from the mujahedeen factions who were active in the Afghan civil war prior to the early 1990s. As powerbrokers, they play an important role in local and national politics, competing in local and national elections. Their role is a controversial one, as they often act opportunistically and switch allegiances. Although many hold warlords responsible for past war crimes and current corruption and instability, many also believe their local warlords are the only reliable protection from acts of violence. Some warlords
ill the need for stability at local level and provide physical security, enforce religious/tribal laws, and promote economic opportunities in areas where the central government has less authority.5
In other areas, the central government has continued to work through informal bodies at the local level, such as community councils (sh r s) and tribal assemblies (jirgas). The Loya Jirga has played a key role in Afghan politics since the
fall of the Taliban, for example by establishing a transitional government in 2002, and ratifying
a new constitution in 2003.6 However, the inability of both the international community
and the current Afghan government to build formal institutions in the last decade has further prevented the development of human security.
the current state of human security
and development
Despite ongoing threats to Afghans’ physical security, Afghanistan’s international ranking on development indicators has improved since
a A warlord can be a military commander, a disarmed former military commander or not have any military background. Examples include:
Ismail Khan, current Minister of Energy, former popular governor of Herat and Mujahedeen commander, disarmed and sent to Kabul by the central government; Maulavi Azizullah Agha, defected Taliban commander from Kandahar; Abdul Rashid Dostum, Vice-presidential candidate, militia leader allied with former communist regime, popular Uzbek leader, allegedly responsible for the Dasht-i-Leili massacre of Taliban prisoners of war
REFUGEES (ORIGINATING FROM AFGHANISTAN):
2,556,556 AS AT JANUARY 2014
(IBID)
COSTS OF CONFLICT
CIVILIANS KILLED ECONOMIC COST NUMBER OF TROOPS
BETWEEN 2007-2012
(UNAMA 2013)
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPS)
600,000
(UNHCR 2014)
BILLION BETWEEN 2001-2014
(COSTS OF WAR 2011)
8
17