Page 29 - PCPA Summer 2025 Bulletin Magazine

CHRIS BOYLE'S LEGAL UPDATE
Id. Conversely, the tip in Navarette "was sufficiently reliable
to credit the allegation" that the offending vehicle ran the
caller off the roadway. Id. "By reporting that she had been
run off the road by a specific vehicle-a silver Ford F-150
pickup, license plate 8D94925-the caller necessarily
claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous
driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support
to the tip's reliability." Id. at 399.
- 9 -
J-S44041-24
Similarly, by identifying a specific store being robbed, the
tipster in the instant case implicitly claimed eyewitness
knowledge of the crime.
Moreover, when Sergeant Lesko arrived, approximately
thirty seconds had elapsed between the flash report and
his arrival, and a man matching the suspect's description
[*13] was standing approximately twenty feet from the
store.
A heightened need to protect the public from a potentially
dangerous felon may call for a different balancing of
privacy rights due to exigency, as reflected in the following
passage from J.L.:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about
the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an
anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even
without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example,
that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the
indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally
conduct a frisk.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74.
We do not suggest that the present circumstances are
equivalent to a tip of a person carrying a bomb. But a
fresh tip of a robbery poses a far more pressing need
for immediate police action than the bare tip of an illegal
possession of a firearm. Robbery is by its nature a violent
crime in a way that illegally possessing a firearm is not.
Firearms can enable dangerous behavior in the future; a
reported robber is a threat to public safety based on actual,
not theoretical, behavior.
We acknowledge Williams' counterargument, which is
[*14] that the officer was not required to detain Williams to
see if the tip had something to it.
Williams' Brief at 14 (arguing that Sergeant Lesko "failed
to observe [Williams]
- 10 -
J-S44041-24
to conduct his own investigation in an effort [to] buttress the
constitutionally required reasonable suspicion prior to the
attempted seizure of [Williams]"). But, again, the ultimate
question is one of reasonableness, and "a case-by-case
approach is hardly unique within our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Numerous police actions are judged based
on fact-intensive, totality of the circumstances analyses
rather than according to categorical rules, including in
situations that are more likely to require police officers
to make difficult split-second judgments." Missouri v.
McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 158 (2013). "Terry accepts the
risk that officers may stop innocent people," and a Terry
stop "simply allow[s] the officer to briefly investigate
further. If the officer does not learn facts rising to the level
of probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on
his way." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
Finally, we agree that the evasive conduct in a high-crime
area is a pertinent consideration. In Wardlow, the United
States Supreme Court held that "nervous, evasive behavior
is a pertinent factor [*15] in determining reasonable
suspicion" and that "flight-wherever it occurs-is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative
of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Id.
at 124. The trial court credited Sergeant Lesko's account
that Williams "began to walk away" after Sergeant Lesko
initially approached and before saying "stop." Trial Court
Opinion, 4/25/24, at 7. The court determined that Williams
"continued to blade his body holding his waist then fled the
location, also giving further rise to reasonable suspicion
- 11 -
J-S44041-24
(unprovoked flight in a high crime area)." Id. We may
not consider Williams' flight in our analysis because that
flight occurred after he was detained. "[T]he police must
have reasonable suspicion at the moment of detention;
information developed after a police-citizen encounter
moves from consensual to coercive cannot be used to
justify the detention." Mackey, 177 A.3d at 228. However,
as the trial court found, Williams "bladed" his body away
from Sergeant Lesko as an "action[] in response to the
officer's greeting[.]" Trial Court Opinion, 4/25/24, at 6.
Our Supreme Court has defined "blading" as a suspect's
"attempt to shield parts of his or her body or clothing [*16]
from a police officer during a stop," which is a factor to
consider "in determining whether there is reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous."
Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 424 n.6 (Pa. 2021).
While we are not addressing a suspect's actions during
a stop so as to authorize a frisk for weapons, the point
remains that blading one's body is an evasive action and is
continued on next page
29
SUMMER 2025 BULLETIN