Page 78 - Ranger Demo

occupied Enemy battle positions was greatly reduced. Sound Ranging was nevertheless fulfilling its object in that it severely curtailed hostile fire. By preventing single Troops from firing, harassing fire was partly reduced, and as about six troops had to be laid on before it was safe to fire, many good opportunity targets must have been missed as well as resulting in uneconomical use of ammunition. Also, it forced the enemy to use his heavies (which were out of our range) to a greater extent than formerly, thus aggravating the already poor ammunition state of these guns.
These precautions against Sound Rangers reacted throughout the enemy front and became apparent
Guns of the Australian 2/8th Field Regiment at El Alamein in July 1942 - WWII Pictures
on the 30 Corps front at this time. This S.R. Troop returned to 30 Corps front only a week or so before the offensive. As it was not desired to disclose the fact that it had returned, in order to obtain as much information as possible, no sound ranging shoots were carried out, although several bombards were carried out on locations obtained. Many good locations were obtained (usually “A”) and much valuable information was acquired as to which positions were occupied. The S.R. Troop of No. 2 Composite Survey Battery had by now arrived in 13 Corps and functioned successfully both on static and radio link bases. The radio link proved its value in enabling SR to be carried out quickly in a changed base while the lines were picked up and re-laid for a new static base
Air Photos
These were the backbone of CB work. The photos provided were mostly from 20” F.L. cameras at a height of about 25,000 feet (scale 1/15,000). One plane was fitted with 36” F.L. camera but although these photos (scale 1/8,500) provided excellent detail they were not used a great deal owing to the small cover provided and the difficulty the pilot had in taking the required area. Air photos were also valuable in showing the results of our destructive shoots on to hostile batteries (see para 8). In the desert hostile batteries are easy to spot on photos but co-ordinates are extremely difficult to deduce
At the start photos were only available occasionally and when urgently needed for operations. As facilities were improved it was eventually arranged that the whole Army front should be covered every four days. As operations were very static and the enemy artillery moved but little, this time interval was adequate for CB purposes. It is estimated that even after four or five days from the last photo cover at least 90% of the hostile batteries were known (i.e. movement during this period was less than 10%). The four-day period could not be strictly adhered to owing to accidents, weather, and special operations. The weather is a matter of importance in considering air photos.
The summer broke at the end of September and thereafter Photo Recces were frequently impossible owing to low cloud or sandstorms.
An anxious time was spent immediately before our offensive as two successive pilots had failed to return, and thereafter there was low cloud every day. The CB Programmes thus had to be made out on information eight days old. Fortunately, the cloud cleared for the three days preceding our attack and
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