Page 14 - TORCH Magazine #23 - July 2023
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day after his death. Israel responded by taking out terror targets, including rocket launchers and weapon-making facilities. However, it strategically held off making its full response until days later.
When PIJ launched its attacks against Israel, PIJ’s leaders went into hiding. They knew that they could be targeted by Israel in immediate response. Israel feigned its attacks, striking some PIJ targets but not revealing its full hand. Israel was waiting for PIJ leaders to re-emerge from their bunkers.
Several days after the initial flair-up, Israel took out three terrorist leaders in precision strikes whilst they slept in their luxury apartments in Gaza. Those killed included Khalil Bahitini, the commander of PIJ’s rocket battalions, Jahed Ahnam, the head of PIJ’s military council and main coordinator of weapons and money trades with Hamas, and Tarek Az Aldin, the commander of PIJ’s terror activities in Judea and Samaria.
Israel’s strikes took PIJ by surprise and sent a clear message to its remaining leadership that Israel knew who they were, where they were located, and what they were up to.
Following the IDF strikes, Israel braced for a response. The Israeli government closed schools and opened public bomb shelters. It ordered people to stay home and avoid driving on public roads near the Gaza border. They didn’t need to wait long.
The terrorists of Palestinian Islamic Jihad had been preparing for this attack for several months and even though some of their main leaders had been eliminated, there was still enough coordination within the terror group to launch a significant rocket attack against Israel.
The commanders that Israel had taken out were replaced with new commanders. Israel then took out three of the new terror leaders who were directly involved in coordinating rocket attacks against Israel and with training up terrorists. The message could not be clearer. Israel was showing that no one in the terror group was immune to Israel’s strikes. Despite Israel striking numerous targets, it was extremely careful in how it handled the situation in Gaza. Israeli forces used precision strikes and specific munitions to lessen damage to surrounding buildings and even called
off strikes when children and civilians
were too close to the terrorists. They achieved this by using surveillance UAVs
to monitor target areas. The IDF released multiple videos online displaying both
the successful strikes and the times when strikes were called off because civilians were nearby.
Hamas is the largest terror group within Gaza and is its current ruling political party. The Hamas terror group has a pact with Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the two share a “joint operations room” where they coordinate actions against Israel.
Despite putting out strong statements that the “Palestinian resistance” was “united” against Israel, Hamas did not get involved in the most recent conflict. There is speculation as to why this is, but the likelihood is that Hamas saw it as too great a risk at this time.
One of the reasons Hamas may have been more reluctant to get involved is because Israel demonstrated that they were prepared to target leaders. It could also be related to the improved quality of life in Gaza.
Economically, Gaza is in a much better place today than it was even three years ago. There has been substantial foreign investment into Gaza’s infrastructure, and Israel has allowed increasing amounts of building materials into the Strip. Gazans