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Sefer Chafetz Chayim םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Zayin - Halachah 9 די הכלה - ז ללכ

not conclude from his silence that the remarks were true, because there רבד שי הז לעו ירמגל םה םירשכ תקזחבו ללכ
the reason is that perhaps (the victim was silent because he understood)
“the circumstances there would not have tolerated any answer he might רחאב אלו הזב תולתל שי יאדוב כ"א תצק רכינה
offer, etc.,” as I wrote further on, but here Rebbe knew that reason was ונאד וננינעב כ"אשמ .שממ רכינה רבדכ בושחו
not applicable.
בנג אוהש רמולו ריעה ינבמ דחא לע קיזחהל ןיצור
The rule that emerges from our words is that from Rashi’s words we have ןכ רמול ןיא תצק רכינה רבד םעטמ ץפחה הז תא
no proof at all that would allow leniency in this law and permit accepting
Lashon Hara as truth and if so how could we ourselves institute a new הברה ואצמי ריעה ישנא לכב קדקדנשכ יאדוובד
leniency, especially since we supported the opposite view at the beginning םינינעב םהירבח ןוממב כ"כ ןירהזנ ןיאש והומכ
of this notation that the only “incidental” testimony Chazal allow in a
Torah precept is the testimony regarding a woman’s marital status. Even ןכלו הזב אצויכו הירבחד אמילגב םהידי בגנל ולאכ
though one could refute this somewhat by arguing that perhaps “incidental” ל"נכו הבינגה םצע לע הרויש רכינה רבד ךירצ
remarks that are Lashon Hara are different than other kinds of “incidental”
remarks and they are believable, still, what basis do we have for making .ש"יע א"שרהמהו ל"שרהמה םשב ו"כ ק"סב
this distinction and creating this leniency, especially since this involves an
esur in a Torah precept? Therefore I wrote that people should be cautious
in this regard. Please see what I wrote at the end of the 16 notation of the
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Be’er Mayim Chayim. םייחה רוקמ
םִאֶשׁ ,וּלּא םינינִעבּ ןיִעוֹט םיִשׁנא המּכּ ,הארְִתּ הזִּמוּ .די
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Hagahah יבוֹטל םירְִמוֹא ,דָשׁח דחא לע םהל שׁיו ,ץפח םהל בנגנ
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I have written all of this based on a commentary of the Maharshal cited םיִכּמ םהו ,םירִכּנּה םירִבדּ דחא לע םהל שׁיֶּשׁ ,ריִעה
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above in the 2 Kelal in the 6 notation of the Be’er Mayim Chayim. The VOL-3
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law derived from that citation is that Rechilut is forbidden even if the first אלֶֹּשׁ אוּה תמאבוּ .הדֶוֹיֶּשׁ ידֵכּ ,ןידּה ןִמ אלֶֹּשׁ ,ןיִשׁנוֹעו
speaker made his remarks “in the presence of three people” and a second
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person “incidentally” repeated what he heard (one may not believe the םצעל היארְ וֹמכּ אוּה םירִכּנּה םירִבדְדּ אהי וּלדּ ,ןידּכּ
remarks). But based on the statement that I wrote in the middle of that ,ךְירִצ אלֹה ,ןידּ תיבּ וֹמכּ יִביִשׁח ריִעה יבוֹטו ,הֶשֲׂעמּה
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citation “If not for the statement of the Maharshal” cited above, it seems
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to me that it is also possible to say that Bar Kapparah’s remarks were וֹא ,םירִכּנּה םירִבדּהל םידִֵע םגו ,בנגנֶּשׁ הלִּחְתִּמ וּעדְיֶּשׁ
made “in the presence of three people” and Rebbe Shimon “incidentally”
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repeated them to his father, Rebbe. ךְֹמסִל אלֹ לבא ,)ארְָטוּז רַמְדּ הֶשֲׂעַמְבּ וֹמְכּ( וּארְִי םָמְצַעְבּ םֵהֶשׁ
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ןיִמאהל קרַ וּלִּפאו .םנִּחבּ לארְָשׂי תא תוֹכּהלוּ עבוֹתּה לע
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Be’er Mayim Chayim 6 ןוֹשׁל תלבּקַ ינְפִּמ רוּסא ,וֹתִּאֵמ בנגּ הז שׁיִאֶשׁ ,בלּבּ עבוֹתּל
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(K7/9/4)-(19)..to repeat them to others: This is no better than had רוּסִּאדּ ,וֹתוֹכּהלוּ הז לע ךְֹמסִל המּכו המּכּ תחא לעו ,ערָה
he seen the event himself, the denigration of a fellow Jew, he would be
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forbidden from repeating what he had seen, as I wrote above in the 4 ."ףיִסוֹי אלֹ"דּ ואל לע םירִבוֹעו ,הזבּ םיִשׂוֹע לוֹדגּ
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Kelal, the 4 halacha. And even though that law was expressed in an
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