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VOL-3
Sefer Chafetz Chayim
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara
Kelal Yud - Halachah 6
desert they gathered Manna on Friday and left it in plain view on Shabbat
attempting to discredit Moshe Rabbeinu and his prophesy (and they failed)
and they instigated revolution by challenging Moshe Rabbeinu’s divine
leadership of the Jewish nation (Bamidbar 16:3) “and why do you (i.e.,
who picked you to) lead G‑d’s holy people?” And Moshe Rabbeinu A”H
was the master of all prophets, the teacher of the entire Jewish nation,
whose honor and prestige was greater than his father’s and even so the
gemara was of the opinion that it would have been forbidden for the court’s
agent to report back to him the remarks made by Datan and Aviram except
for the fact that he was acting in the agency of the Beit Din (meaning, he is
an extension of the Beit Din and is immune from the esur of Lashon Hara
and Rechilut). But for this exception it would be forbidden for someone to
repeat the degrading remarks made about another Jew even if this speaker
was striving to reach the truth of the matter.
Now regarding the issue of repeating to others what this boor said about
another Jew, if this observer \ speaker determines that repeating the remarks
will result in a beneficial outcome, that he was zealously upholding the
honor of a Torah Scholar, then it is permitted to repeat the remarks as long
nd
as he conforms to the seven rules listed above in the 2 halacha (K10/2).
Please see what I will write in the very next notation of the Be’er Mayim,
that there are instances when there are exceptions to this law as stated
here.
Mekor Hachayim
K10/ . There are instances where these remarks could be repeated
to others even if the victim is not aware of them as long as the
observer concludes the victim will gain a meaningful benefit by
it (21) and as long as this observer conforms to all of the seven
nd
rules listed above (22) in the 2 halacha. Please reference the
Be’er Mayim Chayim where I will define “benefit” in order that the
reader not make a mistake. For example, the observer knows this
boor’s personality and from the context of the story he is telling it
is obvious that the same way he is insulting the victim in front of
this observer he intends to go to others and repeat the same insulting
remarks. But this permissibility requires first going over to the boor
and rebuking him for what he said, followed by the boor’s refusal
to accept the rebuke. Because of the many sins of society, it is very
likely that nearly everyone is guilty of violating the sin of speaking
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םייח ץפח רפס
ערה ןושל ירוסיא תוכלה
ח הכלה - י ללכ
ןינעה יפל האור אוה םא ,יולת ,החכוה ןינעלו
אלו וחיכוהל ךירצ ,ותחכות לבקיש רשפאש
לבא ,'ג טרפב ל"נכו וחיכוהש םדוק וילע םסרפי
ךירצ ןיא ,הזב ותחכות לבקי אלש האור אוה םא
עדותישכד ,וחיכוהל אלש בוט רתויו ,וחיכוהל
ז"יע חומצל לכוי יאנגל הז רובע וספות אוהש ול
ןיוכמש תלעותה אובת אל כ"חאש ונייהד לוקלק
'ה טרפב ב"כ ק"סב יתראיבש ומכו ורופיסב הז
.הלחתמ וחיכוי אל כ"ע ש"יע
‘Any remark made in the presence of three people is exempt from the laws
of Lashon Hara.’ Rabbeinu Yonah qualifies this statement as referring
specifically to a case where someone is permitted to disclose derogatory
information about a fellow Jew, for example, that this person is a wanton
sinner and now must be denigrated publicly until he repents. In such a
circumstance the disclosure is permitted as long as it is made in front of at
least three people. Rabbeinu Yonah gives two reasons for this requirement:
The “first reason” is that if the disclosure is made in front of three people
we can assume that it was made so that word of society’s displeasure with
this sinner will get back to him. If it is made in front of only one or two
people (meaning, that those remarks will not filter back to this person) it
would give the impression that the speaker merely wants to gossip about
his fellow Jew. The speaker would also appear as though he does not
want word to get back to this sinner because he wants to flatter him to his
face while degrading him behind his back. Rabbeinu Yonah then goes on
to say that requirement for making this disclosure only in the presence of
three people (i.e., publicly) would then only apply when the speaker has no
reason to fear the sinner. But if the sinner has the ability to cause harm to
this speaker, the speaker would be permitted to talk about him in private
while flattering him to his face, as Chazal have said that it is permitted
to flatter the wicked. Rabbeinu Yonah then gives a “second reason” for
the requirement (of disclosure in public), that if the disclosure is made in
front of only one or two people, society would suspect the disclosure is a
lie, whereas if it was made in front of at least three people (i.e., publicly)
the speaker would not be suspect as a liar since everyone knows that a
respectable person would not make false statements in public”.
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