Page 143 - VOL-2
P. 143

Sefer Chafetz Chayim
                                    Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara

                                           Kelal Gimal - Halachah 8

               he merely writes “if the incident tilts even more towards culpability then
               the observer \ speaker should perceive it as doubtful” implying that if this
              person (the “victim”) is positively culpable then he should be judged as
               positively “guilty”! (and if we would understand Rabbeinu Yonah to permit
               the disclosure of his actions then his statements would be contradictory).
               Therefore the law must necessarily be as we wrote it above.

               Or alternatively, Rabbeinu Yonah (in section # 218) is discussing here a
               person who acted or made statements publicly and in this context Lashon
               Hara is not prohibited and the only issue is the observer \ speaker must
               now decide whether or not the law supported this person’s viewpoint
               (meaning, the observer would have to assess the evidence presented by
               the circumstances and determine whether or not the speaker’s remarks
               are consistent with the law). With this approach we can understand the
               Gemara Babba Metziah (75b) regarding this person (a supposed lender)
               who brought a curse upon himself \ who caused society to curse him (since
               he lent money without witnesses or documentation and is now demanding
               payment with no substantiation of the loan). We explained above in the 10th
               notation that there is nothing forbidding an observer to curse the supposed
               lender because his unsubstantiated payment demands were made in public
               (in Beit Din), as this person (the purported lender) summoned him (the
               accused borrower) to court (and by this action he cast suspicion on himself
               for admitting to have lent money without witnesses or substantiation
               and thus opens himself up to being cursed by society for making an
               unsubstantiated claim) and we only need to determine whether or not the
               law supported his claim (that he lent money to this borrower). But in a
               situation where we are obliged to disclose to others what this person did,
               one must first very carefully study the circumstances. Certainly if the
               incident involved this person in his relationship with G‑d, most assuredly
               one should not rush to disclose it to others, as I will discuss this in the
               coming 4th Kelal. And even if this incident involved this person in his
               relationship with someone else (then before disclosing it to others) one
               must first carefully study all of the conditions for disclosure brought down
               further on in the 10th Kelal otherwise he could easily fall into speaking
               absolute Lashon Hara.

                                                      End of the 3rd Kelal

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