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Sefer Chafetz Chayim
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara

Kelal Dalet - Halachah 4

or swearing (in a matter that would otherwise have required him to take
an oath) since the actions committed by this person were well known to
Jewish society to be forbidden. And in this regard we don’t go so far as
to say that perhaps he did Teshuvah as long as we don’t clearly see that he
did make Teshuvah. This concept is taught in Chavot Yair, in section #62.
(Please see that reference).

And it goes without saying that if there is a benefit that will accrue to some
Jew by testifying that this person is not a qualified witness and that he
is disqualified from swearing an oath, these witnesses most certainly are
obligated to testify even if this particular Jew himself does not compel their
testimony, as is brought down in Shaar HaMishpat, section #28 (paragraph
#2). But rather, even if there is no present benefit to anyone in bringing
this testimony, nevertheless it is not forbidden to bring that testimony if
it is brought to the Beit Din because perhaps it would be relevant at some
time in the future, at a time when this person might have been called as a
witness or might have been asked to swear an oath in a Beit Din and the
Beit Din was informed of his actions and disqualified him, and this was
the motivation of the witnesses who made this disclosure to the Beit Din.
There is a general rule regarding Lashon Hara, that if this person did in fact
commit a sin, then the ability to disclose it depends on the motivation of
the speaker. Is his intention to humiliate or otherwise denigrate this person
(and the remarks are Lashon Hara) or is his motivation to implement an
outcome that will benefit this person (and the remarks are not Lahson
Hara), as we have written several times.

This distinction can also be understood from Rabbeinu Yonah specifically
in the reference cited above in section #215, that “one who does make this
disclosure public is surely committing a crime,” etc. And here, in section
#219 where he discusses that the disclosure may not even be made to the
judicial authorities, he does not use that language. On the contrary, he
writes that if this person’s behavior is such that he repeatedly commits
this sin, then it is appropriate to disclose it to the judicial authorities. The
implication is that if the nature of this person is not to repeat the sin, then
it is preferable not to disclose his actions to the city’s judicial authorities.
But if in fact his actions were disclosed, no “crime” was committed by this
disclosure. (But if this testimony is brought in Beit Din by two witnesses,
the judges are obligated to believe the testimony and to decide the issue
in accordance with the applicable law. But if this testimony is brought
before them not in the context of a Beit Din (outside of a judicial setting),
then these judges are no different than any other person and they cannot do

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