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or great bodily harm only when he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to him- self or such other person, or when he reasonably believes both that:
(1) Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; and
(2) The person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened in- fliction of great bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless arrested without delay.
The legislators included specific language which justifies deadly force if “the arrestee is attempting an escape through the aid of a deadly weapon.” The committee comments attached to the statute indicate a clear legislative intent: “the peace officer should be authorized to act even if the offender has not actual- ly used or currently threatened to use the weapon: the normal inference is that he (the offender) intends to use it to thwart ap- prehension.”
Deadly force is permitted where any arrestee, not just a flee- ing felon, is attempting an escape through the aid of a deadly weapon. The drafting committee comments to section 5/7-5 re- veal that when an arrestee is armed with a deadly weapon, it is a clear indication of danger.
The legislative committee stated that “the peace officer should be authorized to act even if the offender has not actually used or apparently threatened to use the weapon: the normal inference is that he intends to use it to thwart apprehension.”
Also ignored is the fact that courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, have consistently held
that law enforcement must be immune from any liability when shooting criminals who pose no immediate threat to the officer. • People v. Klein, 305 Ill. 141, 146-47 (1922): The Illinois Su- preme Court outlined the common-law rule applicable to the use of deadly force by a police officer in effectuating an arrest. There, the court held, “[a]n officer, generally, may use a deadly weapon, even to the extent of taking life, if necessary to affect the arrest of a felon, for the reason that the safety of the public is endangered while such fel-
on is at large...”
• Onesto v. Police Board, 92 Ill. App. 3d 183 (1st Dist. 1980):
The appellate court held that the action of a police officer in firing his weapon to stop a man who was fleeing arrest after committing the forcible felony of burglary was rea- sonable as a matter of law.
It stands to reason that police officers can’t face liability in any form if they are acting within the law as it exists. Somehow, this has gotten lost in the story. The above law is still on the books and is controlling in this area. Anyone is free to voice an opinion; however, they should know the facts before opining.
I can’t think of a situation where hypocrisy is so apparent. The same politicians who created the law are criticizing officers for doing exactly what they ordered them to do. Police officers are great rule followers — they do what the law requires them to do. Someone needs to stand up to the critics and point out that even if the video does not show the shooting officer in immediate danger, the decision to shoot was still lawful.
In fact, it was exactly what the legislature ordered the officer to do when it put the law into effect. As long as the law remains on the books, all shootings must start and end there. d
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