Page 360 - Orthodoxy Zizioulas

O r t h o d o x y
vidual and person. The individual acts autonomously, self-
defined and self-contained; the person exists only in relation-
ship. Thus death, from an individualistic standpoint, appears
as a private and autonomous event, whereas in a personalist
understanding it is inseparable from the web of relationships
in which the dying person exists.
This distinction is crucial for euthanasia. Modern liberal
thought speaks of “individual rights” and often confuses the
individual with the person. If euthanasia is treated only as the
exercise of private autonomy, then death becomes a matter of
isolated self-determination. But if human existence is per-
sonal, death can never be merely private. It touches all those
relationships from which the uniqueness of the person emerg-
es. The person does not belong solely to himself.
For this reason the problem of euthanasia cannot be solved
simply by general ethical principles or legal norms. Ethics and
law operate by universal rules, distinguishing good from bad,
permissible from impermissible. Yet no general principle can
override the sacredness and uniqueness of the person. This is
why the Orthodox Church does not formulate abstract moral
systems in the way Western traditions often do. It entrusts
discernment to spiritual fathers, who respond to each case
according to the uniqueness of the person involved. Such an
approach makes bioethical questions more complex, but it
preserves the irreducible dignity of each human being.
A second complexity concerns freedom itself. Modern dis-
cussions often assume that euthanasia is acceptable if the pa-
tient gives consent, perhaps even through a living will. Yet
human freedom is never simple. A request for death may arise
under fear, despair, pain, depression, pressure, or subtle coer-
cion. It is often impossible to determine whether such consent
is wholly free. The same problem appears in the Church’s pas-
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