Page 46 - Australian Defence Magazine Oct 2020

46 DEFENCE BUSINESS VIEW FROM CANBERRA
OCTOBER 2020 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
PGMS – HOW
MUCH IS ENOUGH?
In the event of a major conflict, which could be with anyone but specifically the large bellicose nation which buys our iron ore and baby milk formula, we could have a serious supply problem.
A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT | CANBERRA
IN THE OPENING hours, days or maybe weeks, certain muni- tions, especially precision guided munitions (PGMs) would likely be used at a prodigious rate, so that the cupboard could be nearly or utterly depleted.
That’s hardly news and it’s recognised in the 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) which says one of the consistent and important lessons from previous conflicts around the world has been how quickly supplies of PGMs come under stress, especially by those nations with little domestic PGM manu- facturing capability; which would be us.
That won’t always be so. Rafael of Israel and Varley of New- castle are planning domestic manufacture of Spike anti-tank guided missiles, initially chosen to equip the Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles but set to become the Army’s pri- mary ATGM under a joint venture.
Eventually Spike will be used by ground troops and de- ployed on a variety of platforms, likely even armed helicop- ters. Spike manufacture isn’t imminent and until then, Aus- tralia will be beholden to the manufacturers in Israel.
Practically every other PGM in the ADF inventory comes from the US. The FSP proposes the entirely rea- sonable measure of increasing weapon stockpiles across the ADF “to ensure stock holdings are adequate to sus- tain combat operations if global supply chains are at risk or disrupted”.
FSP also proposes redevelopment of the Mulwala facil- ity to expand production capacity to enhance resilience of ADF ammunition supply. A domestic smallarms ammuni- tion manufacturing capability is utterly fundamental to ADF self-reliance and the two plants, run by Thales, can produce pretty much any conventional ammunition the ADF desires. In practice, for some natures of munitions, it’s cheaper to buy on an over-supplied global market.
The real issue is PGMs, which mostly come from the US, are really expensive, generally not available off the shelf and subject to export controls.
Thanks to the notifications of proposed sales by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), we have a good idea of what the ADF would like to buy and what it will cost. Much less clear is what’s actually acquired and when it’s delivered.
For example, in February, DSCA notified that Australia was seeking to buy 200 AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) with related equipment for an estimated US$990 million.
It appears the ADF has been boosting PGM stocks for some time. Example – in October 2017 DSCA notified a pos- sible sale of 3,900 Small Diameter Bombs to Australia. So far so good. But just how quickly PGMs can be used up was demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The US Air Force reported use of almost 139,000 weapons since 2014. Of those Australian aircraft dropped almost 4,000.
The problem for the ADF is that it appears the US is also stocking up, ordering additional supplies of many of the same munitions used by the ADF. DSCA notifications suggest other nations are also securing their own stocks.
For example, the US military is seeking to procure 22,391 Hellfire missiles in the period 2020-25. In its FY2020 bud- get request, the US Department of Defense (DoD) said it wanted the maximum production of Hellfire missiles.
That’s beaut for Lockheed Martin and maybe Australia as US DoD buying power can drive down the price for all customers. The problem is there may not be many available to Australia or the dozen plus other user nations.
A recent report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) examines the very issue of PGM supply, noting that the DoD has requested funding to acquire some 119,800 assorted PGM in the period 2021-25. That’s not everything – it doesn’t include air-to-air missiles such as AMRAAM and AIM-9.
CRS queried whether even this would be enough. Some new weapons such as AARGM, LRASM and JASSM are only being acquired in relatively small numbers.
Then there’s the issue of industrial capacity to meet potential mobilisation demands for an extended high in- tensity conflict. As well, there’s the question of whether US-made PGMs incorporate foreign components, materi- als or software.
The bottom line for us appears to be that if the US has a supply of PGMs problem, so have we. ■
ABOVE: The rate at which PGMs are used in conflict is an issue if supplies are limited.
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