Page 45 - Australian Defence Magazine April 2020

APRIL 2020 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
SPACE OVERVIEW 45
increased prospect of threat from high-level military capa- bilities being introduced into our region.”
Dibb then went on to state regarding Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation that “it may be the time has come when Beijing and Moscow test America’s mettle and see if they can successfully challenge the US in both the Euro- pean and Asian theatres.”
That’s sobering stuff, and it should be ringing alarm bells in Russell. The lazy days of assumption-based planning, around 10-year warning times for a major threat appearing, are over.
US COMMITMENT
A second big strategic risk facing Australia is uncertainty about US commitment to the region. If the US were to retreat into some offshore balancer posture, driven by a serious economic downturn, or a deepened ‘America First’ mindset in coming years, that would fundamentally change our strategic outlook for the worst. Although the US military, and national security and defence policy community are certainly not suggesting a strategic retrenchment from the Indo-Pacific, at the level of US politics, there is less certainty of intentions. That stems from the current Trump administration (and the prospect of a sec- ond Trump term), or as a result of the polarization of US poli- tics that could shape future decisions on where, and to what extent, the US remains in a global leadership role.
Add in the long-term economic and strategic effects of black swans, such as the rapidly emerging Coronavirus pandemic, and the impact of accelerating climate change too. The future is anything but clear.
What does that mean for Australia’s defence policy and ADF capability choices going forward?
Firstly, at the strategic level, Australian defence planning needs to prepare for some radical and potentially dangerous shifts in our region. Dibb’s suggestion of a period of strategic warning means we need to think about boost-
ABOVE: The transition from Space 1.0 to 2.0 gives Australia an opportunity to compete at a different scale.
ence of US Air Force assets at key RAAF bases. Australia should boost logistical and sustainment for US forces, in- cluding to respond to the impact of sustained combat op- erations in the event of a major conflict.
Thirdly, with greater regional burden sharing in mind, we need to review traditional settings for ADF military strategy. A continued reliance on the ‘strategic moat’ of the ‘sea-air gap’ needs to be challenged, in favour of greater emphasis on forward defence in depth. It would be a mistake to as- sume that a reactive, short-range ‘defensive defence’ posture would be sufficient to address the challenge by China’s of- fensive strike capability.
LONG RANGE STRIKE
Instead there needs to be greater emphasis on acquiring long- range strike and power projection capabilities to strengthen deterrence by denial against a major power’s expeditionary forces and forward basing, and to counter their long-range offensive capability. The probable acquisition of up to 200 Lockheed Martin AGM-158C Long-range Anti-Ship Mis-
ing ADF force readiness, mobilization and op- erational sustainment, including planning for the possibility of US-China strategic competi- tion deteriorating into prolonged (as opposed to short-duration) high-intensity interstate war.
“AT THE MOMENT, THE ADF IS A VERY HIGH QUALITY, HIGH TECHNOLOGY FORCE, BUT IT'S ‘BRITTLE’ DUE TO THE LIMITED NUMBER OF PLATFORMS THAT HAVE LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY.”
siles (LRASM) is a good start.
Expanding forward defence in depth needs
to have a coalition dimension through strength- ening defence relationships with key partners that can facilitate forward basing of shorter- range RAAF strike and air combat capabilities.
At the same time, co-development of long-range strike capability with the US and other partners, such as Japan, also makes a great deal of sense. Government should be open to a range of long-range strike capa- bilities, at sea, or through land-based long- range missiles, or through development of
That should be driving questions about
the size of the ADF in quantitative terms.
At the moment, the ADF is a very high qual-
ity, high technology force, but it's ‘brittle’
due to the limited number of platforms that
have limited offensive capability. Does it
have sufficient mass to sustain high inten-
sity combat operations over a period lasting months, or even years, and sustain operations in the face of combat losses that would be inevitable in the face of war with a major pow- er adversary? If the ADF isn’t big enough to meet a much more serious major power challenge, continuing with the same force sizing assumptions must end.
advanced unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs). Acquisition needs to happen more rapidly than current planned defence projects, whose capability acquisition cycles emerging out of the 2016 IIP are too slow in comparison to a rapidly deteriorating strategic outlook, and the rapid pace of technological transformation. For example, Navy’s first Attack class future submarine won’t appear until 2034, and the Hunter class frigates won’t start appearing until the end of this decade. Two challenges emerge from the widening delta between rapid deterioration of our strategic circumstances and the slow pace of major capability acquisition. A slow acquisition of new capabilities, driven by a need to sustain naval ship-
Secondly, we must emphasize a need to step up to bur- den share alongside the US to a greater degree. That could mean significantly expanding US access to Australian fa- cilities beyond that already planned for. Some possibilities would include home-porting US Navy vessels at Fleet Base West and East and expanding further the long-term pres-