Page 40 - Australian Defence Magazine April-May 2021

40 SEA POWER HUNTER CLASS
APRIL-MAY 2021 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
COMMENT
The Hunter program has a challenge in front it; how do they keep their schedule and budget in place in light of AIC commitments when there are so many pressures on the reference design program in the UK? There are no formal mechanisms at this point to ensure AIC compliance until the end of the program at which point Australian business- es have lost their opportunity. What are the consequences for not performing? Is there are a case for a Super Hornet/ JSF style stop gap capability given the timelines?
A recent scathing article from Matt Gurney in Canada’s National Post pulled no punches on the issue of how that nation’s management of the program and offsets framework is failing the country.
LOCKHART CONFIRMED THAT MANY OF THE MAIN SYSTEMS WERE NEVER GOING TO BE DESIGNED OR MADE IN AUSTRALIA AND THIS HAS BEEN THE SITUATION FROM THE OUTSET, MUCH LIKE THE CRITICAL SYSTEMS ON THE ATTACK CLASS PROGRAM.
“The challenge before us is this: our existing fleet of ships are very fine and capable vessels, but they’re getting old,” Gurney said. “They have a decade or two of useful life left in them, but it’ll take us a decade or two to re- place them, because of all the dysfunction noted above. Time is not on our side. We need these ships, indeed, if recent history has taught us anything, it’s that a less sta- ble world will require us to be better armed and prepared than we’ve had to be since the end of the Cold War. So in order to have the new ships by the time current ones rust out, we need to order them now. Like, right now. Today, if possible.
BELOW: Both Defence and BAE Systems Australia are keen for the lessons learned between the Hobart and Hunters classes to be shared.
“It’s that simple. The world is evolving in dangerous ways that our abysmal military procurement system simply can’t keep up with.
“So what do we do? As tempting as it is to indulge in the fantasy that we can do better if we just follow the budget officer’s advice and go with one of the alternate plans, or just try harder or whatever, we don’t have the luxury of kid- ding ourselves into believing we’ll do better next time. We won’t. We need ships. The ships are going to cost us an arm and a leg because we are terrible at this and insist on treating the military as a jobs-creation program for regional industries, rather than an instrument of national security. But there’s no way to solve that problem before the current ships rust out, so, screw it. Build the ships. Whatever the cost. Gonna cost an extra $47 billion? Sure, sounds good. Build the ships,” Gurney concluded.
One industry source involved in all three programs across the globe remarked that the ship designer is considering paying offset penalties rather than absorb the costs to make the engineering changes and engage with the local market and this also which protects the Type 26 home market sup- ply chain. It also raises the question; does an ABN equal AIC? In the short term, this does seem to be the case on more than just the Hunter program. As always, the longer term is harder to clarify.
The path of constant capability/scope changes and polit- ical expedience is well trod in Australia as well. The moral of the story is not good when such interference in a refer- ence design becomes prevalent. Read any ANAO report to confirm that; the Hunter program is set to be examined by that very body in the coming 12-18 months. Will it break the mould? ■