Page 122 - Australian Defence Magazine Dec21-Jan22

122 DEFENCE BUSINESS VIEW FROM CANBERRA
DECEMBER 2021-JANUARY 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
VIEW FROM
CANBERRA
Across Australia and definitely across Canberra, many have lamented they wouldn’t want too many more years like this one – what with the pandemic but, best of all, the government’s decision to go nuclear.
A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT | CANBERRA
THIS correspondent has some small experience of other peo- ple’s nukes, with an opportunity some years back to spend the day aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the north- ern Arabian Sea.
The senior PR man aboard asked what we’d like to see and do while aboard his ship. “Could I have a look at the reactor?” I asked in complete innocence. The reply: “You are now standing as close as you will get to the reactor.” This illustrates how protective the US is of its nuclear technol- ogy – which could well be a recurring theme of Australia’s acquisition of nuclear subs over the next couple of decades.
Some years later, this correspondent spent a few hours aboard the French Navy submarine FNS Rubis alongside in Toulon. As nuclear attack boats go,
Rubis was elderly and on the cosy side –
In that vein AUKUS does seem more of the same – creat- ing a united front in the Indo-Pacific against China.
Back to nukes: The UK, which would normally sell us any military equipment our hearts desired, was constrained from sharing its nuclear sub tech under the end-user agreement with the US.
But France faced no such constraints and would joyfully have sold us their Rubis-class boats, albeit built in France and, lacking any domestic nuclear industry, Australia would have been reliant on the French for much support.
They weren’t even all that expensive per boat, although the total capability would have been. That worried Navy, for it would surely have meant less money for surface ships.
2,600 tonnes submerged – a bit smaller than a Collins-class boat. As the boat was being serviced, we didn’t get to see too much beyond the control room and certainly not the reactor space.
“WHILE THE US WAS UNWILLING TO SHARE ITS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITH A CLOSE ALLY LIKE AUSTRALIA,
IT HAD PREVIOUSLY SHARED IT WITH THE UK”
This was the early 1980s, when it was looking to replace its aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne, which ultimately paid off in 1982.
Melbourne was sold to China for scrap where she purportedly provided useful de- sign data for the PLA-Navy as it set about developing its maritime capabilities.
According to Yule and Woolner, talks with France continued up to the elec- tion of the Hawke Labor government in March 1983. Labor was strongly anti-nu- clear and France’s testing program in the
This was the nuke Australia might
have had in place of Collins. According
to Peter Yule and Derek Woolner, authors
of The Collins Class Submarine Story,
Australia was looking for an Oberon-
class replacement and considered what
nukes could be available from the US, Britain and France.
Pacific – admittedly a long way (8,000 kilometres) from the Aussie mainland – was loudly proclaimed as Gallic despoil- ing of our backyard.
Going nuclear was never a realistic option and it would have been truly courageous for any Australian govern- ment to buy French nuclear subs at that time. But just think where we would be now if Malcolm Fraser or Bob Hawke had decided the national interest justified this momentous step. ■
ABOVE: Britain’s Astute-class attack submarine is one of two designs in contention for the RAN’s nuclear-powered ambitions
While the US was unwilling to share its nuclear technol- ogy with a close ally like Australia, it had previously shared it with the UK. Under the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, the Americans agreed to share data on nuclear weapons, submarine propulsion and more.
The Brits appear to be the beneficiary of a fortuitous event – the launch of the Russian Sputnik satellite in October 1957 which shocked the US, convincing them of the need to shore up the western alliance.
There’s a pattern here. Australia and the US signed the ANZUS agreement in September 1951, a bit over a year after North Korea’s invasion of the south which carried real risk of a communist victory.
UK MOD