Page 95 - Australian Defence Magazine Sep-Oct 2022

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
LAND WARFARE GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE 95
AS DAYS became weeks and the Russian military still had not secured the skies, the feats of Ukraine’s outnumbered air force coalesced into the fictitious ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ story of a fighter ace who had shot down 40 Russian aircraft.
To date, the Ukrainian Air Force continues to fly com- bat sorties in old MiG-29s and Su-27s, despite being out- gunned by superior Russian Su-30 or Su-35 aircraft. In a recent interview with Air Force Magazine, one pilot (call- sign Nomad) described these as ‘suicide missions’:
“Every one of us understands that we have lack of capa- bility in old aircraft,” said Nomad. “The Russian aircraft have much more capabilities. They usually fly beyond vi- sual range. They usually use missiles that have a range of more than 80 miles.
“By the time a Ukrainian pilot has seen the Su-30 or Su- 35 jet he is up against, it has already fired.”
Yet despite Russian superiority in both fighter jet capa- bility and numbers, the stories of the ‘Ghost’ and Nomad highlight Russia’s inability to achieve even the first ob- jectives of its invasion. Ukraine’s success in preventing Russian dominance of the air is partly due to the tenacity and audaciousness of its air force. But it is also due to the success and resilience of ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems.
As Seth Jones, Director of the International Security Pro- gram at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, wrote: “The Russian air force failed to achieve air superior- ity against a Ukrainian military with notable air defence ca- pabilities, such as Stinger man-portable air-defence systems, S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, and other systems.”
Evidently, one lesson from the war in Ukraine is the im- portance of GBAD to all-domain operations against a peer competitor. Without air superiority over Ukraine, Russia is less able to support the advance of its ground forces and is thus far less likely to achieve its strategic aims.
In light of this lesson, as Australia recapitalises its mili- tary against the threat of peer conflict in the Indo-Pacific, it is worth re-examining current capability and acquisition plans for ground-based air defences.
SHORT-RANGE GBAD
Australia’s current short-range GBAD capability is a man- portable air defence system (MANPADS) currently com- prised of the Saab Bofors RBS 70 as the principal weapon, the Giraffe AMB radar, and the Tactical Command and Control System (TaCCS), which Saab developed in Aus- tralia to analyse radar tracks and assign threats to one or
“ONE LESSON FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE IS THE IMPORTANCE OF GBAD TO ALL-DOMAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST A PEER COMPETITOR”
multiple RBS 70s. The Giraffe AMB pro- vides early warning against threats such as rocket, artillery and mortar rounds, and is reportedly capable of detection at a 20 kilo- metre, 360-degree range, and can backtrack mortar firing points from 10 km by tracking shells in flight.
The RBS 70 system has been in service in Australia since 1987 and the Giraffe AMB radar since 2010, when it was acquired un- der Land 19 Phase 7A. The RBS 70 has been optimised against targets such as attack he-
LEFT: A NASAMS Canister Launcher, firing an AMRAAM missile
licopters and uncrewed aerial vehicles – much the same targets as those that the Ukrainian Armed Forces hit with frequency using Raytheon-made Stinger MANPADS and even Stugna-P anti-tank guided missiles.
The capability was upgraded a few years ago under Air 90 to include Mode 5 functionality in the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) capabilities of the RBS-70 and Giraffe AMB, further lowering the risk of accidentally engaging friendly aircraft. This was the first such certification out- side the US and allowed Australian RBS 70s to deploy on operations with US and coalition forces.
The RBS 70 capability is being replaced through the ac- quisition of the Raytheon-Kongsberg National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) under Land 19