Page 40 - Australian Defence Magazine July-August 2022

40 INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENCE BASES
JULY-AUGUST 2022 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
Similarly, the resilience of Australian space launch capa- bilities can also be improved through infrastructure diver- sification and mobile launch. Multiple spaceports reduce the strategic importance of each one, and mobile launch adds another layer of resilience. Both also improve Austra- lia’s sovereign access to space.
NAVAL BASES
One of the most significant changes to Australia’s naval in- frastructure will come by virtue of the nuclear-powered sub- marine acquisition. Prior to the election, the Coalition an-
submarines will require a massive increase in the number of Australian submariners. In order to attract a crew, those submarines will need to be based near major east coast population centres: the RAN cannot escape the reality of Australia’s highly urbanised and concentrated population.
There is another problem. In recent years, China has in- creased its sub-surface awareness in the waters north of Australia, particularly through the bathymetric data it has collected through its research ships, and known Chinese acoustic sensors that track the passage of US submarines.
A nuclear-powered submarine may be very difficult to detect in the open ocean, but at some point it must come or go from a naval base; and unlike conventional submarines, nuclear-pow- ered submarines are noisy and cannot switch off their reactors. If China were to use a military base in the Solomon Islands to improve its underwater surveillance of Australia’s east coast, it may gain greater visibility of submarine patrol patterns – forcing Australian submarines to travel further east to avoid the shallow water chokepoints off the Queensland coast. This means longer transit times and reduced time on station.
If a Future Submarine Base must be near a major city on Australia’s east coast for recruitment and retention, and assuming China’s regional subsea intelligence improves, then perhaps these vulnerabilities could be offset through greater investment in forward naval basing infrastructure off the Australian continent.
BELOW: RAAF Base Tindal is undergoing a series of upgrade programs, but like all Defence bases it isn’t hardened against missile attack
“AN AUSTRALIAN F-35 MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DETECT WHILE IT’S IN THE SKY, BUT AT SOME POINT IT MUST RETURN TOONEOFONLYAFEW AVAILABLE AIRFIELDS”
nounced that it was considering Brisbane, Newcastle and Port Kembla as preferred sites for a Fu- ture Submarine Base.
A 2011 report on future sub- marine bases, however, did not preference Brisbane or New- castle due to transit distances to deep water as well as high levels of shipping traffic (a particular issue in Newcastle, with flood- ing susceptibility and a difficult
harbour entrance). Both are also distant from the Navy’s ammunition facility in Eden on the NSW far south coast, while Port Kembla was described as ‘small and congested’.
Another main concern is the nuclear-powered submarine workforce. Defence has long known that submarine person- nel discharge rates in Western Australia are already high, due to civilian work opportunities and separation from ex- tended family on the east coast. A fleet of nuclear-powered
NIGEL PITTAWAY