Page 81 - Australian Defence Magazine June 2021

JUNE 2021 | WWW.AUSTRALIANDEFENCE.COM.AU
LAND FORCES TANKS 79
In this line of argument, the Boxer CRVs and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) fill complementary but ultimately different roles that are primarily determined by the size of their guns. CRVs find the enemy; IFVs suppress the enemy; tanks destroy the enemy.
Army has an undeniable requirement for protection and different calibre weapons on a battlefield, but how that is delivered remains an open question. If protection is pro- vided by an IFV, can destructive firepower come from a combination of other ADF assets, such as self-propelled artillery, drones, helicopters, fast jets or even a Loyal Wingman? The tank’s ability to ‘destroy the enemy’ may be unique amongst the armoured vehicle fleet, but is it truly unique in the networked, 5th gen
This is not to say the tank is obsolete – it is simply to say that, so far, we haven’t been able to answer the tax- payer’s question.
THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE TANK
Now for a different view: why do we need tanks on Aus- tralian operations?
The argument for tanks looks at past Australian opera- tions and other countries’ more recent experiences, name- ly: Australian tanks in Vietnam, which reduced relative casualty numbers and vastly improved action success rates; Israeli action in Gaza in 2008-2009; and Canadian tank operations in Afghanistan.
joint force that the ADF wants to be?
The counterargument is that other plat- forms don’t have the ground-level persis- tence of tanks, which aren’t affected by weather or other constraints. But equally, airborne and long-range weapons are less vulnerable to modern anti-tank weaponry (which Turkey has displayed to great effect in Syria), do not demand the same logistics burden and appear to have proved tacti- cally sufficient in every Australian deploy- ment since Vietnam. So why does such destructive firepower have to come from a
“IF TANKS ARE MORE MOBILE THAN OTHER GROUND-BASED VEHICLES AND OFFER MORE PROTECTION AND DESTRUCTIVE FIREPOWER, WHY ARE WE ACQUIRING BOTH BOXERS AND IFVS?”
Australian tanks were undoubtedly use- ful in Vietnam and Israeli, Canadian and Australian soldiers clearly attest to the val- ue of having a 60 tonne armoured vehicle on the battlefield. But this raises another question: if “a Joint Land Force committed to combat without [tanks] does so at a dis- advantage,” why haven’t we taken our tanks anywhere in almost five decades?
Well, a tank is hard to move. The ADF knows this: the landing craft on-board the Canberra class LHDs were unable to transport a fully-loaded Abrams to shore until significant modifications were made. Even then, Commodore Stephen Hughes,
tank, and specifically an Australian one?
Second, BRIG Mills and LTCOL Purdy also dispel the
myth that tanks have poor mobility: “In terms of tactical mobility the M1 eclipses all other ground-based vehicles... the M1 can rapidly accelerate to around 65 kilometres per hour on road and travel off road at around 50 kilometres per hour, allowing it to sprint between positions of cover. It can ‘pivot’ or turn on its own axis, climb a 60 per cent slope or a metre high wall and cross a gap of about three metres, such as a trench, at speed.” It also posits that tanks “have the highest level of physical protection of any ground combat vehicle” as a moving shield for infantry.
This is certainly impressive, but it inadvertently raises questions about the tactical utility of CRVs and IFVs. If tanks are more mobile than other ground-based vehicles and offer more protection and destructive firepower, why are we acquiring both Boxers and IFVs? Is one armoured troop carrier with a cannon not enough?
The answer may be that all three work ‘symbiotically’ in the same way that air forces use fighter and reconnais- sance aircraft, performing different but complementary roles. That’s true, but the question here is why exactly the ‘find, suppress and destroy’ approach requires three sepa- rate vehicle platforms. Can two vehicles work symbioti- cally to achieve the same effect?
In short, the argument for the unique tactical utility of the tank inadvertently raises questions about the unique tactical utility of other armoured vehicles and does not sufficiently make the tactical case for the tank in the context of the modern joint force. Are tanks a ‘need to have’ or a ‘nice to have’? If they’re a ‘need’, why do we also ‘need’ both Boxers and IFVs?
then-Director General of Navy Capability and Sustain- ment, said that one of the outstanding issues for Defence was not just transporting tanks to shore “but the actual application of the tank in the amphibious warfare space.”
Given the ADF is designed to be an amphibious force, this is problematic for the operational utility of the tank.
That’s the conclusion the USMC has come to. Its Force 2030 report recommended divesting the entire capacity of seven tank companies, from which many platforms have since gone to the US Army.
“We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capabil- ity, despite its long and honourable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority chal- lenges in the future,” the report said. “Heavy ground armour capability will continue to be provided by the US Army.”
The Australian Army, of course, is not the USMC and can’t simply rely on the US Army or indeed other coali- tion partners for occasions where it does need tanks. But neither is it just a smaller version of the US Army; a huge organisation built to win large American wars.
There is also the obvious counterargument that tanks are a versatile capability that can support unexpected op- erations around the globe. But now we’re just back at a pre- vious question: are tanks a ‘need to have’ or a ‘nice to have’?
It’s hard to look past the fact that the ADF has been involved in numerous unexpected operations over the last 50 years and has never felt the need to take tanks. Other countries have – but the question this article is address- ing is why the ADF needs tanks, not why Israel or the US Army needs tanks.
It remains unanswered.