Page 52 - Australian Defence Magazine November 2021

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RE-EVALUATING THE ‘SOVEREIGN’ IN SICP
In September this year, Defence announced four new Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities (SICPs) in response to an evolving strategic environment. Like many in Australia’s defence industry, TAE Aerospace welcomes the ongoing iteration of these priorities. It is now equally important to re-evaluate
our concept of sovereignty in response to these same global shifts.
By examining what degree of self-reliance Defence
needs from its industry partners in a deteriorating strategic environment, defence industry can play its part to manage and mitigate Australia’s strategic risk.
In this article, TAE Aerospace shares its view on sovereignty as a continuum, with ‘full sovereignty’ at the far end.
It outlines why it wants to reach this goal and the steps
it is taking to get there.
What does it mean to be ‘Sovereign’?
As others in defence industry have noted, Australia takes a broad view of sovereignty in the context of SICP. This extends to the criteria we use to qualify a company as sovereign, and how
we assess sovereign capability.
If we view sovereignty as a continuum, then progress can be marked by an increasing level of sovereign control over capability delivery.
At the start of the continuum, we might place overseas-owned companies that establish an Australian entity to support
a specific Defence project. They conduct work here, providing jobs, investment, and capability, but sovereign control ultimately resides with their home country.
Further along the line are sovereign Australian companies
that meet the more stringent Defence Industry Security Program (DISP) qualification. They are Australian owned, operated
and headquartered, but rely on global supply chains for critical components. Limited control over their supply chain gives them only partial control over the delivery of certain capabilities.
At the far end of the continuum are sovereign Australian companies with end-to-end capability in-country, or a high degree of sovereign control over their supply chain. With unrestricted access to components, skills, labour and IP, they
can assure priority capabilities are delivered in a timely way
for sustained periods. This self-reliant capability, when delivered by a sovereign Australian company, is what TAE Aerospace terms ‘full sovereignty’.
The concept of self-reliant capability that underpins full sovereignty seems closely aligned with Government intent. SICP policy defines priority capabilities as those “considered operationally critical because of the essential strategic advantage they provide to the ADF. They must be developed and supported by Australian industry because overseas sources do not provide the required security or assurances of access and supply.”
(SICP Industry Plan: Aerospace Platform Deeper Maintenance and Structural Integrity, November 2020, p11).
MRO capability for multiple Defence engines.