Page 23 - Bugle Autumn 2014

Op NEWCOMBE 2: Oct 13 – Mar 14
In September 2013 1 RIFLES deployed a 21-man Infantry Short Term Training Team (STTT) to Mali on Operation NEWCOMBE
2 as part of the British contribution to the European Union Training Mission – Mali. The team was composed of volunteers from all five companies and individuals were selected for their skill sets and performance during Pre Deployment Training.
Our mission was to train a Malian Armed Forces (MAF) infantry company capable
of operating in the context of Battle Group (BG) combined arms manoeuvre. We
had learned however from our 1 R IRISH forebears that the previous graduates from the first two MAF BG (known as Groupe Tactiques Inter-Armes , or GTIA in French) would most likely work as independent company groups in huge Areas of Operations hundreds of kilometres across and largely non-contiguous. The implied task therefore was that we had to ensure that the companies we trained were not only capable of BG tactics but, perhaps more importantly, that they were capable of independent operations at company and platoon level and particularly good at Framework Operations.
EUTM Mali is comprises 23 nations of
the EU all making their own mark in the development of the MAF. Serving directly under the command of the UK Infantry Training Team (UKITT) was a six man team from the Defence Forces of Ireland and a six man team from a French Infantry Regiment.
GTIA combined arms exercise in the final week. The first two weeks were focused on core skills based around the French idea
of ‘reflex actions’ (basic skills). By the end of week five we had systematically worked through fire team, section and platoon level. We then transitioned to platoon and company group operations with a focus during week six on operations in an urban environment using an abandoned housing estate close to camp. In week seven we conducted a more
battles and pay particular attention to some things on certain days and on another focus our effort elsewhere.
We highlighted early on that leadership was not particularly strong in the MAF companies that we trained. Much of
our work on Op NEWCOMBE therefore progressed on twin tracks: part teaching, part mentoring and advising. Under our lead we persuaded the EUTM chain of command to allow us to design and deliver
conventional company
exercise in a rural
environment before
moving onto a ‘control
the zone’ exercise in
week eight. ‘Control
the Zone’ (Stabilisation
Operations in British
doctrine) is the MAF
most likely mission in the north of Mali following graduation so was vital stepping stone in their training. Weeks nine and ten saw us conduct GTIA level exercises with the latter being a combination of ‘control the zone’, offensive and defensive actions. Alongside, and running like a golden thread throughout the ten week syllabus, were international humanitarian law, leadership, first aid, driving and signals training.
Cultural differences were significant; we found that we needed constantly to remind ourselves that what may seem the norm to us may not be the done thing in the Malian
a series of discussions on leadership for
young officers, which, combined with the occasional prompt, had a positive effect. One of the real strengths
of the syllabus was
its delivery by platoon commanders to platoon
commanders. We also got French and Finnish platoon commanders to help teach.
Reward came in a number of forms. Firstly, Malians enjoying training with their allies and taking it on board was great
to see and a real signpost of success. Secondly, it gave us the perfect context
to resurrect the somewhat lost art of very simple section and platoon level infantry training; all you need to train is some Riflemen and some real estate. All of
the training team can be credited with inventiveness, imagination and vision in their planning and execution of lessons.
We highlighted early on that leadership was not particularly strong in the MAF companies that we trained
The training program was condensed into a ten week package which saw us train from individual soldier level up to a
system (for example, continuation training Capt Guy Walker, Second-in-command, seemed an alien concept to the MAF). We C Company
often found there was a need to pick our
Op NEWCOMBE 3: Mar – Sep 14
In the time we have been there the challenges facing the Malian armed forces have been made evident and we have
seen first hand how the mission in Mali
has changed; our tenure here has seen wholesale changes in the Malian cabinet, the first combat deployment of EU trained Malian troops, the end of the French led combat operation, Operation SERVAL and significant change in the North with the evolution of insurgent TTPs and power shifts in the political landscape of the conflict. It has been in this context that we have trained two companies worth of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF) for immediate deployment
to the North. The training team is made
up of a diverse mixture of both young and experienced Riflemen; for some it is their first operational deployment; for others it is the first taste of a type of deployment that is likely to become increasingly more common after years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Shared across all those who are deployed are the challenges of building
Tamasheq, Peule and Bambara soldiers of GTIA WARABA forget tribal divides during a debrief
THE RIFLES
FIRST BATTALION 21