Page 33 - Cormorant Issue 19 - 2016

of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and it is a member of the European Defence Agency (EDA). Regarding its military contribution, Romania has con rmed its participation in the HELBROC (with Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus) and ITROT (with Italy and Turkey) Battle Groups and
has successfully contributed to CSDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, the Gulf of Aden, Rafah, the Palestinian territories, the Congo and South Sudan, as well
as supporting the EU’s civilian crisis management operations. Romania’s commitment to Europe is counterbalanced by its investment in its strategic alliance with the US which derives from 2003 when it was the rst country to allow the use of air bases for the Iraq con ict, followed in 2005 by an agreement for the US to use military bases in the country and, subsequently, to host missile interceptors as part of proposed US defence shield.
Romania itself is a country of contrasts. It was easy
to see why Bucharest was known as the ‘Little Paris’, with its wide boulevards and grand buildings a mix
of restored splendour next to faded grandeur. Not far from the hustle and bustle of Bucharest the poverty and traditions of Romania’s rural communities was evident as we travelled to Brasov to visit the Romanian Aerospace Industries and Airbus Helicopters Romania factories, two companies sharing the same site but occupying different centuries in terms of culture,
ethos and production methods. The visit to Brasov included a visit to Bran Castle of Dracula fame and
the week nished with a visit to the People’s Palace
in Bucharest, a similarly evocative place which Ceausescu almost bled his country dry to build and today is a symbol of the strength of the Romanian people who ultimately overcame his tyranny.
Brussels
Lt Col Chris Boryer RGR
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND Defence College hosted our 2-day seminar on the EU’s Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP), held at the EU’s Committee of the Regions building. The seminar covered a lot of ground, with headlines including: European security
strategy; The EU’s attempts to develop a comprehensive approach; and the theoretical utility of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to cooperative capability development. Undoubtedly the EU’s capacity for proactive, meaningful collective security activity in the military sphere is constrained by national agendas, differing commitment by members, and the absence of a lead nation with the presence of the US. However its proponents would point to both the establishment of mechanisms (such as the EDA to promote cooperative capability development) and its power in using nancial and diplomatic levers to deliver security effect as evidence of its relevance. It is noteworthy that following the Paris attacks it was the EU to whom France turned formally for solidarity and support.
At SHAPE and NATO HQs it was clear that NATO staff have a re-energised sense of purpose as a consequence of the dual threats emerging from the East and South. Yet to be formally asked to focus on the southern threat from Islamic fundamentalism, NATO’s present priorities are the threats posed
by a resurgent Russia. Brie ngs were very frank with regard to areas in which improvement is required, with key ones including: streamlining of
“
decision making; development of robust deterrence capability and improving our collective ability to conduct high-end war- ghting in the European area of operations. Much store is of course being set in the commitments undertaken at the Wales Summit, with the 2016 summit in Warsaw providing a key milestone to measure progress. The message
was very much one of positive, accelerated activity to deliver the requisite levels of deterrence and capability; although the competing security concerns of those members in the east, and those in the south contrast starkly with differences in military capability and nancial commitment between member states that present some signi cant challenges to the 28-nation alliance. Of note was the clear message from the US that it considers itself an enduring central pillar of European security, regardless of its concurrent focus in the Paci c. The blunt message was the US will remain invested in Europe’s security because history shows Europe cannot be left to its own devices without slipping into anarchy!
Evidently the week provided a prime opportunity
to get to the heart of security matters with some of the key staff at the centre of NATO, and to a lesser extent EU, security policy making. The challenges, external and internal, facing both organisations are manifest and complex; not least of all the ‘ rewalls’ which exist between them, preventing joint planning and constraining deliberate complementary activity. Acknowledging the intractable nature of some of
the drivers behind this split; one can’t help but conclude that until a way is found to better integrate the nancial and diplomatic clout of the EU, with the military power of NATO, we will be handing a degree of advantage to those who wish the West ill.
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The blunt
message was the US will remain
invested in Europe’s
security...
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