Page 12 - The Royal Lancers Chapka 2017

10 REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL LANCERS (QUEEN ELIZABETHS’ OWN)
There are too many cavalry (armoured and light) or ‘recon- naissance’ regiments. The result of this glut is a disjointed distancing between these regiments and the division. The level of command at which reconnaissance regiments are grouped is now assumed as the brigade. This note comments on this organisation, reflects on conceptual developments in 2017, and considers the future of divisional reconnaissance.
Four additional problems help define the reconnaissance land- scape. Firstly, an over-reliance on non-persistent technical ISR, wildly successful in a decade’s worth of campaigning in two ‘per- missive’ theatres (with good weather!). Secondly, bad doctrine that at combined-arms is close-battle-centric, and at special-to- arm is out-dated and riddled with Operation HERRICK-TTPs.1 Thirdly, this same poor doctrine taught in our schools and on our staff courses has bred an under-trained cohort of too few generalists and too many specialists (or lobbyists).2 Lastly, false lessons that are often too quickly internalised from a training engine that, in field exercise terms, trains only single BGs, often under-contextualised and focused entirely on the close.3
The 2017 Royal Lancers Battlegroup’s Command and Staff Tac- tical Training Exercise (CSTTX) left an armoured cavalry bat- tlegroup cramped for time and space: craving space, we could not disperse and protect ourselves; lusting after time, we were unable to influence the brigade plan before the enemy was on the main defensive area. Unimaginatively shackled to the main body by the limit of close support fires (c. 10 km from the For- ward Line of Own Troops) and medical timelines (to name but two ‘separation drivers’4); and, boxed-in by brigade boundaries, we were consistently unable to offer the brigade commander the value of reconnaissance, perpetuating the axiomatic frailty of re- connaissance, mounted on its infirm platform. It was, therefore, with more than misty-eyed nostalgia that discussions about di- visional reconnaissance were invigorated.
Back to the future
‘A regiment will normally operate under corps or divisional command reporting direct. In certain circumstances squadrons may be placed under command of subordinate [brigade] head- quarters but this will be exceptional.’5
In 1989 the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) had two Ar- moured Reconnaissance Regiments (Tracked) (of four medium recce squadrons) operating with the BAOR armoured divi- sions (1st Armoured Division (QDG) and 4th Armoured Divi- sion (16/5L), loosely grouped under 1st (BR) Corps Screening Force (commanded by BAOR Brigadier RAC)). The BAOR’s 3rd Armoured Division had its reconnaissance regiment based in the UK (9/12L). Reconnaissance squadrons supported bri- gades independently: B Squadron, The Blues and Royals in the Falklands with 3 Commando Brigade; A Squadron QDG as 7th Armoured Brigade’s recce element (grouped with 16/5L as 1st
1 Capability Directorate Combat Mounted Close Combat Doctrine - Volume 2 Royal Armoured Corps Tactics, The Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment 2011.
2 Generated through the plug and socket augmentation of Headquarters from Battlegroup to Division from functional brigades
3 Observations from training a Battlegroup in a synthetic brigade context (e.g. Exercise PRAIRIE STORM) leads to false lessons being internalised: ‘lead with an ISR Group or a strong Advance Guard’ and the ‘benefit of a strong covering force’ (CO 1 R WELSH Observations from CSTTX dated 26 Mar 17) is sympto- matic of the formation-level covering force battle not played-out in front of the Battlegroups.
4 Those factors which, due to the recce gap, the idiosyncrasies of the covering force battle and the capabilities tactics, techniques and procedures of Armoured Cavalry, generate planning considerations and risks.
5 The Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 2: The Armoured Division in Battle dated 1990.
(United Kingdom) Division’s Recce Regiment) on Operation GRANBY; and, D Squadron HCR during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with 16 Air Assault Brigade.
The 1993 Options For Change defence review reduced the num- ber of armoured reconnaissance regiments to two in line with the removal of the BAOR’s divisions. 6 However, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and the 2003 Defence White Paper7 increased the number of armoured reconnaissance regiments to four (and latterly five), whilst reducing the number of squadrons from four to three. This increase in armoured reconnaissance regiments was an exercise in historic cap-badge saving, ‘re-roling’ from ex- pensive Challenger to cheaper CVR(T), rather than a capability- demand signal for more reconnaissance across the Army. 8
Operation ENTIRETY compounded the Army’s embarrass- ment of reconnaissance riches with the creation of ‘hybrid brigades’ to fulfil the double-medium scale enduring force re- quirements of Afghanistan and Iraq. Withering the division (and divisional troops), brigades were structured to deliver the ‘vertical slice’ demands of the Operational Establishment Table and its broadly war-fighting capability-agnostic line-serials. A Formation Reconnaissance regiment to each brigade, now re- termed the Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment (BRR), entered our lexicon. This endured through the Strategic Defence and Security Review, and Army 2020 (with the now-termed Ar- moured Cavalry regiments attributed to 3rd (United Kingdom) Division’s Armoured Infantry Brigades, and newly termed Light Cavalry regiments to 1st (United Kingdom) Division’s Infantry Brigades). Two additional reconnaissance regiments were also created with the re-role of the RDG and SCOTS DG from Challenger 2. The drumbeat of cost saving was audible over the stringy overtures of ‘strategic circumstance’ and ‘defence engagement’ as the need for change. Having been cut deeply for this raft of reconnaissance regiments, combat support and service support are either conspicuous by their absence, or char- acterised by their toothlessness. As Army 2020 is refined to the 2025 Future Army Structure, we see AJAX-equipped Armoured Cavalry regiments grouped with strike brigades, though this order of battle should not necessarily be conflated with a war- fighting task organisation.
Allies and Adversaries
There is value in considering how our adversary and allies em- ploy reconnaissance forces. Our ‘peer-plus’ adversary, defined in training terms as Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army (occasion- ally veiled behind some unconvincing alias), like the rest of Russia’s ground forces, organises reconnaissance platoons to battalions; reconnaissance companies to regiments (formation- sized) and independent tank brigades; reconnaissance battalions to divisions; and, a reconnaissance brigade to an army (NATO corps-sized). At each level these reconnaissance forces are ‘task organised’ to include organic electronic warfare and signals intelligence (EWSI) capabilities and unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
Though the US Army does attribute cavalry ‘squadrons’ (unit- sized, similar to a UK regiment) to their brigade combat teams (BCTs), equivalency is complicated as the composition of US cavalry squadrons differ. Cavalry squadrons are more combined- arms by design with organic mortars 60mm, 81mm and 120mm
6 an amalgamation of the 16/5L with 17/21L to form the (armoured) QRL
7 UK MoD, Delivering Security in a Changing World, 2004.
8 Which continued still further with the re-roling of three Challenger 2 squad- rons within Armoured Regiments to CVR(T) Scimitar as interim Medium Armour Squadrons.
Divisional Re(con)naissance