Page 142 - The Royal Lancers Chapka 2018
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140 REGIMENTAL JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL LANCERS (QUEEN ELIZABETHS’ OWN)
  Trench map (corrected to 3 September 1916) showing the battlefield in front of the Quadrilateral (Q), with green arrows added to show the cavalry track as completed on 15 September. The yellow blocks show the deployment of the dismounted cavalry that afternoon and the yellow arrows the line of their advance to a forward trench
A 200 yard wide ‘corridor’ had been left free of shelling to al- low the tanks to get forward, meaning that the German wire and machine guns remained intact. Brigadier General W L Os- borne of 16th Brigade wrote in his diary that ‘the artillery bar- rages were made to suit the tanks; the tanks failed, and our men had to advance across the open with no help from the barrage; also, the quadrilateral had not been worked over by heavy guns beforehand.’
While the cavalry were at work immediately behind them, the in- fantry attack went ahead as planned at 6.20 am behind a creeping barrage. The diary of 1/Leicesters describes how they advanced ‘at the walk’ through ‘terribly thick’ mist and smoke, the leading companies in four lines with thirty yards distance between the lines. Their bravery can be appreciated today by walking from the Guillemont-Ginchy crossroads towards the site of the Quadrilat- eral, over an expanse of flat fields devoid of cover. By 0900 it was clear to 6th Division HQ that the attack had failed; none of the in- fantry had made it as far as the Quadrilateral. By the end of the day Osborn’s 16th Brigade had sustained 752 casualties, with the 71st Brigade to its left suffering similarly badly – 9/Norfolks alone lost 449 men, including 18 officers. Osborn described how his men ‘at- tacked most gallantly against a very strong position ... the 1st Buffs supported the 8/Bedfords with the finest courage but could not stand against the very heavy machine gun fire opposed to them.’
The circumstances of the dismounted cavalry action are revealed in the report by Grenfell two days later ‘in the train for Havre’ to the GOC 1st Cavalry Division, written when he was undoubt- edly in much pain from his wound. This report has never previ- ously been published, and is transcribed here with some punc- tuation added for clarity. Lieutenant Gisborne was his adjutant and Major Sidney commanded a detachment of the 2nd Cavalry Division Dismounted Party (Queen Mary, University of London Archives: Grenfell Family Papers; NL/GRE/11/2; Arthur Gren- fell First World War memorandums, 1916):
To GOC 1st Cav Div
I beg to report that shortly after my message to you when I was resting in a reserve trench Lieut Gisborne reported to me that the situation in front of Guillemont seemed very complicated, that Major Sidney wished to move back (and) would I go up and see for myself. I saw a great many infantry, evidently the left of the 6th Division retiring in great numbers and leaving a large gap. I ordered the Cavalry to dig a trench covering the left flank and I put out a line of skirmishers. I went forward to try and ascertain the true position. The infantry told me
  The first page of Major
Grenfell’s report on his actions of 15 September 1916, written two days later in a hospital train to Le Havre (Queen Mary, University of London Archives: Grenfell Family Papers; NL/GRE/11/2; Arthur Grenfell First World War memorandums, 1916).
2nd Lieutenant (later Major) William Guy Gisborne, 9th Lancers, aged 19, taken after his commissioning in October 1914 and before his promotion in May 1915. He rejoined the regiment in 1939 and was wounded in France in the following year (© IWM (HU 115089))
  
























































































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