Page 14 - GALIET THE HEROIC SPECTACLE OF MORALS: Hume IV

Galiet & Galiet
antagonist, rival;31 and traits, such as avarice, ambition and vanity, given the social apathy they incur. The majority, removed from most self-serving concerns and actions, feels indifference and disregard towards them, says Hume.32 The reason? These private passions, along with their peculiarities, kindle in each human breast different and particular rather than universal sentiments of affection or rejection. On the other hand, whoever otherwise ascribes the negative epiteths vicious, odious, depraved departs from the particular, expressing a universal sentiment that expects social consesus. “He must touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony... that principle of humanity in which every man, to some degree, concurs.”33 In this private-to-public unfolding process, no form of egoism can thus sustain total apathy because the human heart is never wholly indifferent to public welfare. Human sympathy, says Hume, may not be universally as esteemed as self-serving vanities or ambitions, but because it is common to all men... it can alone be the foundation of morals or a universal system of blame or praise.”34
Self-interest & Indifference fails. Hume stiches the wolf and serpent. Self- interest, thus, cannot be morality’s first mover because it cannot account for every moral sentiment.35 It is not only “contrary to common feelings and our most unprejudiced notions,” Hume admits, but it is also self-evident that a genuine interest for commonwealth and “dispositions such as benevolence and generosity and affections [such as] love, friendship, compassion, gratitude”36 exist. Indifference towards the welfare and suffering of others as humanity’s end is absurd and inhumane to Hume.37 Yet, Hume is deeply alert to the fact that our beneficence is limited to our immediate inner social circle. Even in this narrow circle, he defends, society will always judge our moral character given our generous service.38 Accordingly, we must adopt a more public affection,39 says Hume, by accepting that public interest is not indifferent to private interest.
31 Virtue Ethics. Section 222. 32 Virtue Ethics. Section 221. 33 Virtue Ethics. Section 222. 34 Ibid. Section 222.
35 Ibid. Section V. Part II.
36 Appendix 2. Paragraph 6. He believes that a future human nature hypothesis may reveal these affections to be ‘modifications’ of the selfish passions.
37 Conclusion.
38 Hume. Treatise. 602
39 Virtue Ethics. Section V. II.
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