Page 408 - Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Language

Formal Semantics
interpretation of T. If at the initial stage the code of this sentence is in the extension of T, then this value will not change. In the other case it will not change either. The reason is that both the assumption that This sentence is true is true and the assumption that it is false are coherent.
Under a suitably dynamic perspective on the action of 'calling a sentence true,' it is possible, contrary to what Tarski believed, to make semantic sense of the everyday usage of the truth and falsity predicates of natural language. The revision perspective on truth was developed by Gupta and Herzberger under the influence of Kripke (1975). (See Visser (1984) for an overview; important source papers are collected in Martin (1984). Barwise and Etchemendy (1987) and the article Paradoxes, Semantic also provide further details and discussion.)
See also: Paradoxes, Semantic; Truth.
Bibliography
Barwise J, Etchemendy J 1987 The Liar An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford
Enderton H B 1972 A Mathematical Introduction to Logic. Academic Press, New York
Kripke S A 1975 Outline of a theory of truth. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 690-716
Martin R L (ed.) 1984 Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Tarski A 1956 The concept of truth in formalized languages. In: Tarski A Logic, Semantics, Metamathentatics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Visser A 1984 Semantics and the liar paradox. In: Gabbay D, Guenthner. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. IV. Reidel, Dordrecht
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