Page 55 - bne monthly magazine October 2022

bne October 2022 Southeast Europe I 55
group to undertake a detailed audit under the direction of a Special Commission.
“We consider the financial intervention for malignant interests, which contradict the national interest of Albania and its Western orientation, to be a flagrant violation of the country's sovereignty, by an aggressor who is washing the friendly people of Ukraine in blood,” Berisha added.
Basha stepped down as party leader after the Democrats’ defeat in local elections in early 2022, opening the way for Berisha to return as party leader.
In general, Albania is notable in the Western Balkans for the lack of Russian influence on domestic politics. Overall, along with neighbouring Kosovo, Albania is seen as the most pro-US and more broadly pro-Western country
in the region. Unlike several of its neighbours it is not a Slavic or Orthodox nation, and relations with Russia are cool among politicians across the political spectrum (at least publicly).
The 2017 election – in which the state department source claimed to AFP
that Russia had backed the Democrats – resulted in a heavy defeat for for the party at the hands of Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialists.
The vote was a critical one for Albania as its conduct was seen as a test for
the country’s democratic credentials
as it tried to get approval from EU countries for the start of accession talks. It followed threats by the opposition
to boycott the vote, which were later resolved, paving the way for it to take part. As noted by the OSCE at the time the vote “took place in the context
of a long-standing and deep political division between the [Socialist Party] of the ruling coalition and the opposition [Democratic Party]”.
Russian influence in Bosnia and Montenegro
Russia remains influential among Bosnian Serb politicians, with the Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, Milorad Dodik, a long-time adherent of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Leading Bosnian Serb politicians have been threatening the secession of Republika Srpska, the county’s Serb entity, for years. More recently, Dodik has blocked efforts
in 2017, Russia appeared to step up
its efforts to prevent its accession by destabilising it internally. Russian agents were accused of being involved in the
“We consider the financial intervention for malignant interests, which contradict the national interest of Albania and its Western orientation, to be a flagrant violation of the country's sovereignty, by an aggressor who is washing the friendly people of Ukraine in blood”
by Bosniak and Croat politicians to impose sanctions on Russia over the invasion
of Ukraine. Infighting among Bosnian politicians has also stymied efforts to move closer to EU and Nato accession.
He has continued to pursue closer ties with Russia, and plans to meet Putin in Moscow later this month.
Montenegro was once dubbed ‘Moscow- on-Sea’ – not just because its coast was such a popular destination for Russian holidaymakers, but also because of the tiny country’s close relations with Russia. However, as the country under the former ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) moved steadily into the Western orbit, aspiring to join both the EU and Nato, relations with Moscow soured.
As Montenegro prepared to join Nato
failed coup plot ahead of the October 2016 general election; leaders of the pro-Russian Democratic Front were also convicted in what became known as the ‘trial of the century’ but their sentences were overturned following a change of government in Podgorica.
Three months before Montenegro’s Nato accession, DPS leader Milo Djukanovic, now Montenegro’s president, claimed the plot was an attempt by Moscow to demonstrate to the West that Europe and Nato cannot expand without its consent.
Djukanovic’s DPS was ousted in the 2020 general election, and – following two government collapses since then – a broad coalition of small parties, of which the Democratic Front is the largest, is expected to form the next government.
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