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bne December 2020 Opinion 71
Three decades on from the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is learning to be just Russia. Its imperial ambitions have fallen away and it is becoming more pragmatic in its relations with its neighbours, as evidenced by its recent actions in Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Nagorno-Karabakh
– the Russian-speaking south-eastern part of Ukraine escaping, with Moscow’s support, from Kyiv’s rule – appeared only briefly; Donbas was an improvisation gone awry; and even carving
a land bridge to Crimea, never mind a march on Kyiv – both undoubtedly advocated for by some in Moscow – were never attempted. That said, the Baltic states and Poland were about as safe – or unsafe – after Crimea as they were before it.
Of course, Crimea’s return to Russia was widely celebrated
in the country, but as much for the fact itself – “correcting [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev’s injustice” of transferring the peninsula to the Soviet Ukrainian republic – as for the fact that, as if by miracle, it happened peacefully, literally without a shot being fired, and – legalism aside – in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of the local population. The so-called Crimea majority – 80 percent of the Russian people – on which the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin personally could rely for a few years after 2014 – came in very useful in domestic politics. The fact is, however, that the powers that
be made full use of the effect of Crimea, not that the entire Crimea operation and the subsequent one in Syria were designed to buy popular support.
Russia is an autocracy. On the most important issues there
is just one decider. Foreign and security policy is Putin’s private domain. This doesn’t mean, however, that his decisions are completely arbitrary. Russia’s operation in Syria was undertaken in such a way as not to create parallels in
the popular mind with the tragic experience of the war in Afghanistan, which resulted in 14,000 Soviet deaths. So a US-style air force-cum-navy engagement was ordered, with local and regional allies fighting on the ground. Russian battlefield involvement in Libya has been assigned to a private company: essentially, soldiers of fortune. Putin’s actions may be putting others off balance, but the risks he has been taking are calculated. Expecting him to be on an interventionist spree just to keep himself in place was at best a gross misunderstanding of the realities and constraints. So much for imperialist nostalgia.
Russia’s loss of dominance is yesterday’s news
Second, the news of Russia’s loss of influence in the post-Soviet space is very dated. The Baltic states have been in NATO for sixteen years; Ukraine has been pro-Western and anti-Russian since the Maidan revolution; so has Georgia, only for a decade longer; Moldova is torn in both directions, but leaning more toward the West; Azerbaijan is closely allied with Turkey; Uzbekistan is vociferously independent; and Turkmenistan
is reclusive, shunning foreign connections. That leaves only Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – five out of fourteen ex-republics – as Moscow’s formal allies and partners. In many of those countries, however, particularly
in Central Asia, China has long been a major outside player.
Moreover, since gaining independence from Moscow, all of Russia’s nominal allies have been pursuing what they proudly call multi-vector foreign policies. The Collective Security Treaty Organization that Moscow leads is an alliance in name only. There is no defence integration and only very light co-ordination. The allies do not always support Moscow in UN voting, and – very tellingly – none of them have recognised Crimea as part of Russia. They have no wish to get involved in the US-Russia confrontation, so as not to be slapped with US/ EU sanctions. As for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU),
it is little more than a customs arrangement, and many of its member states do as much or more business with China than with Russia. In cultural terms, in the last three decades Russian has been losing out there to the local languages and English.
All by itself
Does this all mean that Russia is being diminished in its neighbourhood, even as it seeks to project its influence farther abroad? Is it also a sign that it is getting weaker as an international player? The answer is that Russia is painfully adapting to the rapidly changing environment. Eight years ago, in my book Post-Imperium, I argued that Russia was leaving its historical empire behind. At a time when Putin had announced his vision of a full-fledged Moscow-led Eurasian Union that would include Ukraine, and Dmitry Medvedev was
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