Page 62 - RusRPTAug24

62 Opinion
bne August 2024
The National Rally has pledged to halt French deliveries of long-range missiles to Ukraine but it is unclear whether Marine Le Pen’s party would really expend political capital on changing France’s policy towards Ukraine, the invasion of which it condemned.
“When in opposition, parties criticise Ukraine; when they come into government it forces them to become more moderate,” says Kreko, pointing to the example of Greece’s Syriza and Italy’s Five Star movement.
But France is not the only country to fall to the far right. Italy has already been taken over by Georgia Meloni’s far-right
(but Ukraine-supporting) Brothers of Italy, while pro-Moscow extremist parties look set to have big influence inside the new Dutch, Belgian and Bulgarian governments, and to do well
in the upcoming Austrian elections. They could eventually constitute a blocking minority inside the European Council.
This is all happening at a time when Europe is lacking strong centrist leadership from other big states such as Germany and Spain, and thus this could transform the overall mood towards the war.
“The next five years [of the European Commission] will be much more complicated, not so much because of the results in the EP elections but because of the repercussions in the member states,” Thu Nguyen, deputy director of the Jacques Delors Centre, told the CEU Democracy Insight webinar.
But the real challenge comes in November, she warned, with the potential election of Trump giving a boost to pro-Russian forces in Europe, and raising serious questions over whether Europe can continue to support Ukraine on its own.
“The US election is much more important,” says Nguyen. "The real question is how we in Europe will prepare for Trump.”
Israel emerging as source of tension in Azerbaijan’s special relationship with Turkey
Bahruz Samadov for Eurasianet
There is no strategic partnership in Eurasia stronger than Azerbaijan’s ties with Turkey. But Baku’s close relations with Israel are increasingly becoming a source of friction in the Azerbaijani-Turkish alliance.
Public sentiment in Turkey is decidedly pro-Palestinian in
the ongoing conflict between the Israeli military and Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip. All major political parties in Turkey are likewise supportive of the Palestinian cause to one degree or another. At the same time, Azerbaijan remains a staunch friend of Israel. Baku’s extensive economic and security ties with Israel played a key role in assisting the Azerbaijani military
in retaking Nagorno-Karabakh territory from 2020-2023.
Given the discrepancy in views, it is not surprising that allegations of Azerbaijani oil sales to Israel, volumes of which reportedly transit Turkish territory, have prompted protests outside the Azerbaijani state oil company’s (SOCAR’s) offices in Istanbul. Protesters have tacitly accused Azerbaijani leaders of undermining the special relationship between Baku and Ankara, carrying banners with slogans such as “Two States, One Betrayal.”
On June 20, SOCAR’s Istanbul office experienced another bout of vandalism, as protesters waving a Palestinian flag threw rocks at the glass windows of the building.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s regime is not
www.bne.eu
known for its tolerance of protest or dissent, but authorities have shown an unusual level of forbearance for the pro-Palestinian demonstrations, although police did arrest 13 individuals for disorderly conduct on May 31.
Domestic political factors are pushing Erdogan to stake out an ardently pro-Palestinian stance. His ruling AKP party experienced a drubbing at the hands of the main opposition CHP in the late March local elections. A significant factor in the vote was a public perception, held by both conservative
Aliyev (left) and Erdogan during a one-on-one meeting on June 10. The sim- mering tension in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations could be seen in what was reported – and not reported – in official accounts of the meeting. / President.az