Page 25 - RusRPTSept22

The above responses about ‘being on track’ and ‘feeling fine’ correspond with a growing number of positive replies provided by respondents to a question about the country’s economic situation. While, at the end of 2021, the year before the war, 48% of respondents evaluated Russia’s economic situation as ‘average’; 41%, as ‘bad’; and as few as 9%, as ‘good’, four months after the special operation started and all kinds of sanctions were launched, the proportion of negative answers decreased and the share of positive responses rose. The majority (57%) are now moderate in their assessment: they perceive the country’s economic situation as ‘average’. Most importantly, 40% of Russians believe that in a year life in Russia will be ‘better than now’. Fewer respondents (27%) think it will remain ‘as it is now’, and even fewer sceptics (18%) expect life to be ‘worse than now’. Russian exports are shrinking, while 55% expect ‘improvements in the economy’ in a year. Despite the negative attitude of many countries to Russian policy, 47% are convinced that Russia will see ‘some improvement in political life’ in a year, while another 13% believe in ‘significant improvement’. (Among both groups, an overwhelming majority approve of Putin’s adventurism.) One cannot assume that these people hold such views because they know nothing about what is going on in Ukraine. Fifty-six per cent of respondents claim that they are following the situation in Ukraine ‘closely’. Eighty-one per cent of respondents are ‘concerned about the current events there (in Ukraine)’. Nor can the optimism of the majority be linked to expectations that the special operation will end soon. Not more than half of respondents think that it will end within a year or sooner, while the rest expect it to take more than a year or find it difficult to name an end date at all.
Opinion polls contain a great deal of other evidence of this exceptional state of the Russian mass consciousness. One can draw parallels to what was observed in 2008 and 2014. In both cases Putin’s popularity rating soared to 88%. It has been at 83% for five months in a row now, which is also well above average for Putin. However, both in the case of the peace enforcement in Georgia and in the case of Crimea, most Russians perceived the events as a victory, and Putin was seen as its mastermind. Regarding the outcome of the current special operation, 73% believe in a Russian victory, but none of those surveyed think that this outcome has already been achieved. The difference is that those conflicts were resolved within days, while the special operation has dragged on for months.
One should also be sceptical about the widespread justification that this state of Russian consciousness is solely the result of propaganda. Propaganda can do a lot, but it has its limits. Propaganda only formalises and articulates the configurations of meaning which are formed in mass consciousness due to internal and external factors; propaganda is only one of them. These mass perceptions are long-entrenched. They represent the complex outcome of the transformation of ideas about Russia’s mission which have developed over several centuries in the Russian ruling class, and which have outlived that class. The ideas were unconsciously embraced by Russia’s victorious new elites, who imagined Russia leading the liberation of mankind. Then the goal of liberation was forgotten, but the idea of standing at the helm of half the world, if not the whole world, remained. As it seems to many present-day Russians, Stalin succeeded in achieving this; this was the outcome of the Second World
25 RUSSIA Country Report September 2022 www.intellinews.com