Page 35 - bne magazine September 2023

bne September 2023 Cover story I 35
“Yes, it is scary, as you can spend life in jail, but we don't self-censor,” says a senior editor at one of Russia’s top business papers. “The problems are specifically for those writing about the war, and it’s related to politics. Reporting on the war or saying it is bad is not the main thing. The main problem is the laws are so vague, you never know what is going to happen. You don’t know what constitutes a state secret or when you are revealing
figure complaining they have been misrepresented. In these cases, Zhelonkin says he listens to the complaints and occasionally, if they are justified, may make some small changes. “But these are opinions or clarifications. Otherwise we stick to the fourth estate values, or at least we try to,” says Zhelonkin.
Another senior editor of a top business paper adds that for those not working on the war, the biggest change has been
propaganda talk shows and the news reporting is biased to match the Kremlin’s agenda, reporting by the broader press remains much more objective. The difference is that TV reporting reaches tens of millions of viewers, whereas newspapers cater collectively to a few percent of Russia’s population. The Kremlin feels confident in largely ignoring the press reporting.
Still, Zhelonkin is walking a thin
red line. With the denuding of Vedomosti, which was one of the most authoritative Russian newspapers until its ownership change in 2020, Kommersant today has arguably remained in pole position in Russia’s newspaper landscape.
The paper’s cautious and balanced approach to old school journalism has earned it respect. When the new US Ambassador to Russia Lynne Tracy was appointed in April this year, the first and only interview she gave to the Russian press was to Kommersant. In the interview, Tracy presented an unvarnished US
view on hot-button issues in current relations between the two countries. The text caught a lot of flak from Russian government officials, while Russia’s Foreign Ministry published a lengthy and emotional response on its website.
Since the war started, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has given one single interview to the Russian press in March last year. The press pool that talked to him included Kommersant’s special correspondent Vladimir Solovyov (not connected to the Russian propagandist from state TV The First Channel of
the same name). The interview was highly controversial with Russia’s media watchdog Roskomnadzor, which demanded that the interview not be published in Russia. Roskomnadzor and the Prosecutor General's Office announced their intention to investigate the outlets that participated in the interview, but nothing happened in the end. Although the interview was not published in Kommersant, the newspaper and Usmanov personally were criticised by pro-Kremlin journalists like Sergey Mardan of Komsomolskaya Pravda, who called for shutting down the paper.
“The main problem is the laws are so vague, you never know what is going to happen. You don’t know what constitutes a state secret or when you are revealing ‘counter-sanctions information’ until after you have published a story”
‘counter-sanctions information’ until after you have published a story.”
Even when the vague laws do not lead to the prosecution of a journalist, there are other ways of putting pressure on them. For example, after Kommersant special correspondent Elena Chernenko organised and signed an open letter opposing the Kremlin’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine, she was expelled from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s pool of journalists and barred from attending Ministry events. She continues to write for Kommersant to this day.
Zhelonkin says the paper’s editorial decisions are based on the same principles of free speech, objectivity and the duties of the “fourth estate”, where the press’ role is to provide citizens with the information and ideas they need
to exercise their democratic power. However, he admits the situation in Russia is more complicated than in the West. “We do take calls, including political calls. I get them from time to time. But we almost never change anything, and when we do, it is to clarify a position,” he says.
According to Zhelonkin, the Kremlin is not micromanaging the press. More often, it's a politician or other public
the reduction in the amount of official information released into the public realm, although many of the main metrics are still being published.
For example, on July 12 the Russian central bank released its current account results, which showed Russia’s trade balance has gone negative to
the tune of $1.4bn – news that was welcomed by Ukraine’s supporters as evidence that sanctions are working.
The currency account embarrassment came on the back of January’s news about the budget deficit, which hit the full-year target after the first ten days of March after the Russian finance ministry reported a whopping RUB1.7 trillion hole in the state’s balance sheet.
Russia’s business press reported on these embarrassing results without problem.
“Anything that is officially released by the authorities – the central bank, the ministry of finance or economy – are fine to report. They are in the public realm and so are fair game,” the editor said.
Flying below the radar
While Russia’s state-dominated TV programmes constantly run pro-regime
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