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     Ukraine. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu said that while the deployment of combat troops is not currently being discussed, there is the possibility that France will send military personnel to Ukraine to train Ukrainian troops or participate in mine-clearing operations.
Nato, despite its aggressive expansion eastward and its membership expansion to new countries, has always been full of contradictions regarding how and how much its members should finance their armies. In 2006, Nato set a guideline for its members' defence spending at 2% of GDP. The members committed to this guideline, and life went on. None of the countries actively contemplated that these funds really needed to be allocated, and as a result, most members did not meet the target. Eighteen years have passed, and Nato has finally faced the reality of actively opposing Russia. The rhetoric that spending is indeed necessary began to gain momentum again, and in 2022, the alliance members reaffirmed their commitments to allocate 2% of GDP to defence. Two years of active military operations have passed since then, and let's take a look at how things stood in 2023. Most countries still allocate far less than 2%. The laggards, unsurprisingly, are Luxembourg (0.7%), Belgium (1.1%), and Spain (1.3%). However, unexpectedly, Turkey (1.3%) also found itself at the bottom of the list, despite its constant belligerent stance towards not only Iran but many of its European allies as well. The leaders in spending turned out to be, of course, Poland (3.9%), the USA (3.5%), Greece (3%), and Estonia (2.7%). While the situation with the USA and Poland is more or less clear, Greece, in this case, was at least surprising to me. The other key members of the "militant" West found themselves in their expected places: the United Kingdom (2.1%), Germany (1.6%), and France (1.9%). Overall, the expenditures reflect the behavior of the leaders of these countries quite well. The higher the spending, the tougher the rhetoric.
The international criminal court in The Hague has issued arrest warrants for two senior Russian military figures who are accused of being responsible for a missile campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure between October 2022 and March 2023. The arrest warrants are for Lt Gen Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash of the Russian armed forces, and Adm Viktor Kinolayevich Sokolov of the Russian navy. In a statement, the court said it “considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the two suspects bear responsibility for missile strikes carried out by the forces under their command against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023.” It continued: “During this time-frame, there was an alleged campaign of strikes against numerous electric power plants and sub-stations, which were carried out by the Russian armed forces in multiple locations in Ukraine.”
The EU plans to include Ukraine in the bloc's defense industry support scheme with a separate budget of €1.5B. The EC plans to propose Ukraine's membership in the EU defense industry support scheme. This will both incorporate Kyiv's experience and bring Ukraine closer to EU
 46 RUSSIA Country Report April 2024 www.intellinews.com
 





























































































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