Page 68 - bne IntelliNews monthly magazine October 2024

68 Opinion
bne October 2024
the expulsion of Russian border guards from Zvartnots Airport, and Russia’s acute need for weapons, it was expected that arms deals between the two countries would be halted once and for all.
However, it was recently revealed that Russia has resumed arms supplies to Armenia under previously concluded contracts. Specifically, this concerns the supply of rockets
for the Smerch multiple-launch rocket system. A year ago, Russian media reported that the rocket manufacturer NPO Splav had approached Yerevan about the readiness of an order for shipment, but the Armenian side did not collect the rockets. It was also reported that after the 2020 war Russia offered and was ready to supply Armenia with weapons and ammunition on credit for amounts of $1bn and $400mn. The smaller contract was approved and ready for signing, and only days remained before the approval of the $1bn contract when Armenia abruptly rejected the agreements. Instead, Iran
and Armenia have signed a major arms deal worth $500mn. Additionally, Armenia has become the largest buyer of Indian weapons. As reported by Report, citing data from the Indian agency IADN and the Ministry of Defence, the total amount of arms purchases by Armenia will reach $600mn in the 2024-2025 fiscal years. Since 2021, Armenia has been actively
acquiring missiles, artillery systems, air defence systems and other weapons from India.
India, according to official data and various sources, is actively strengthening military-technical cooperation with Armenia. Between 2023 and 2024, Yerevan purchased a wide range of weapons from India, including advanced missile systems, air defence systems, tanks, armoured vehicles, howitzers, small arms, and unmanned aerial vehicles. These supplies significantly bolster Armenia’s defence capabilities amid the unstable geopolitical situation in the region. In addition to cooperation with India, Armenia is also actively purchasing weapons from France, indicating an expansion in the geography of military supplies and a desire to diversify arms sources. Moreover, Azerbaijani media reported on the potential supply of American military equipment.
It is noteworthy that Armenia’s arms purchases from Nato countries, including France and the US, have not become an obstacle to receiving Russian missiles, indicating the continued strong ties with Moscow in the military sphere. The question remains whether Armenia will return to previously suspended contracts with Russia given the changing political and economic situation.”
Russia gets ready to rebuild its military stockpile Ben Aris in Berlin
Russia is set to embark on a long-term military reconstitution programme aimed at restoring the losses incurred during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has already increased the upper limit of men under arms to 1.5mn on September 16, but the biggest challenge will be to equip them and replace the materiel already used over the last two years of war – and pay for it.
Europe is facing the same dilemma, but, as bne IntelliNews reported, has a much more serious shortfall and a lot less money to spend on rearming. Germany, in particular, will not be able to return to pre-war levels of armament for decades.
While the Kremlin has yet to finalise the future design of its armed forces, the broad outline of its strategy is beginning to take shape, according to analyst Dara Massicot in a recent in-depth report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Massicot warns that reconstituting Russia’s military should not be viewed as a simple restoration of pre-war personnel and equipment numbers. “Reconstitution is a process of regaining combat functions, proficiency and capabilities that will allow a force to execute various types of combat
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missions,” she explains. How the army will be rebuilt will depend on what Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to do: conquer the Baltic States, or defeat Nato in a world war.
Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has focused on reconstituting its forces without placing its economy on a full wartime footing. This has involved partial mobilisation in 2022, repairing existing equipment, purchasing weapons and ammunition from abroad to supply ongoing operations and offering substantial financial incentives to attract volunteer soldiers in lieu of a general call-up. However, Russia’s military production capacity, apart from the notable exception of drones, has plateaued as of early 2024. “Russia could generate more efficiency by reducing corruption on the margins and emphasising innovation, but this would not result in a dramatic increase in available resources,” Massicot notes. To make a serious attempt to bring stockpiles back to pre-war levels will require a complete retooling of the entire Russian economy.
Economic strain and mobilisation
To significantly increase weapons production or manpower, Russia would need to activate further mobilisation powers, which would have profound effects on the economy, labour market, and public engagement with the war. “The Kremlin’s