Page 15 - RusRPTFeb24

As the Ukrainian war increasingly becomes seen as a small, peripheral war, however, the world’s view of Zelensky has also changed. He’s still a hero, just a distant one: someone else’s hero.
The power of the Zelensky effect has also weakened. When the leader of a country under attack leaves to give a speech to a foreign parliament—still wearing military fatigues—he gets a standing ovation and promises of support. The second, third, and fourth time he does it, the effect is not the same.
In addition, political heroism has another, more dangerous dimension. From being a hero and savior, Zelensky risks becoming the man who ordered others to their deaths. The mobilization that helped Ukraine to survive in 2022, and even allowed it to retake territory, is now seen by some as the reason they lost their loved ones.
Now the reduction in the intensity of hostilities in Ukraine is weakening the arguments of those calling for a big push to achieve peace. Instead, the aggression seems to be ending of its own accord.
Putin only has enough soldiers to stage local offensives that are unable to significantly move the front line. Moscow does not want to enact another unpopular round of mobilization, and the Kremlin is hoping Ukraine will simply run out of men for defense first, so that Russia has enough to mount an offensive.
Putin has been unable to wipe the smile off his face since the failure of Ukraine’s counteroffensive made it clear that the fighting could swing in Russia’s favor. It appears that the answer to the question “how much longer can Russia continue to wage war?” is “for as long as necessary.”
The Russian economy is doing well despite persistent inflation, the imbalances caused by rising military expenditure, and record-high interest rates. GDP grew 3.5 percent in 2023, and there was 7.4 percent growth in manufacturing, helping to smooth out some of the inequality between poorer and wealthier regions. Moscow continues to reap large profits from oil and gas exports. Economically speaking, it’s clearly possible for ordinary life in Russia to continue despite the war.
The relatively low intensity of the fighting and Putin’s imminent reelection as president mean the brutal new version of Russia is here to stay. In the West, the idea that dealings with Russia are inevitable, whatever the nature of the regime, is gradually gaining traction—and that means the future legitimation of a dictatorship via international contacts with both the West and the East.
If contact with the West really is resumed, then sanctions will begin to look like the punishment of ordinary Russians, given the treasury’s income from international trade. And while it’s one thing for ordinary Russians to suffer from sanctions along with the regime, it’s quite another for them to suffer instead of the regime. Nor does anyone seem to have an answer to difficult questions such as: “What happens if the absence of Western servicing causes a Russian passenger plane to crash?”
15 RUSSIA Country Report February 2024 www.intellinews.com