Page 11 - MEOG Week 20
P. 11

MEOG PoLICy MEOG
 minister has won praise for his speed in putting a Cabinet together and the technocratic flavour of his appointments.
Observers were reassured by the appointment of experienced figures like Finance Minister Ali Allawi and General Abdel-Wahab Al-Saadi as head of the counter-terrorism service.
however, Iran-aligned elements accuse him of green-lighting the US attack that killed Ira- nian Quds Force leader Qassem Soleimani and paramilitary overlord Abu-Mahdi Al-Muhan- dis in January. Al-Muhandis’ Kata’ib hezbollah militia described Al-Kadhimi’s nomination as tantamount to a “war against Iraqis,” suggesting that the prime minister should be “behind bars.”
Lebanese hezbollah-affiliated cleric Ali Kou- rani, meanwhile, accused Al-Kadhimi of plot- ting with the US to disband Al-hashd Al-Shaabi. Other hashd elements are temporarily giving him the benefit of the doubt.
Militia leader Qais Al-Khazali previously accused Al-Kadhimi of killing Soleimani and spying for the US, but then emerged with con- ditions under which he would accept his candi- dacy – including (of course) steadfast support for the hashd.
In a catastrophic economic climate, Al-Ka- dhimi is faced with the unenviable task of slashing salaries, laying off employees, cutting subsidies and imposing taxes.
According to one source: “Iraq is like a rac- ing car that has been neglected and repeatedly wrecked. Al-Kadhimi is not the racing car driver. he’s the tow truck driver.”
The hashd’s readiness to allow Al-Kadhimi’s appointment may be premised on the awareness that nobody could navigate Iraq through the coming tumultuous year and emerge without their reputation destroyed.
Iraqi oil revenues plunged from $7.1bn in April 2019 to $1.4bn in April 2020, and are set to fall further given OPEC’s production cuts. The government requires about $4bn per month just to pay state employees.
Two full months of oil income would be required to cover the $2.16bn annual budget of Al-hashd Al-Shaabi.
In Iraq and Lebanon, the hashd and hezbol- lah will fight tooth and nail to ensure they are not affected by budget cuts; including using corrupt revenue sources and their foot soldiers on the
state payroll.
In this fraught political environment, there
are fears that militias are again resorting to assassinations and violence to confront all chal- lengers. Following the deaths or disappearances of a string of figures associated with the protest movement, lawyer and activist Daoud Al-ham- dani was assassinated in Diyala in recent days.
One pledge Al-Kadhimi may deliver on is preparing the ground for early elections, as promised to protesters – offering a glimmer of hope for Iraq. In 2018, the Iran-aligned paramil- itary Fatah list won a dismal 48 out of 329 seats, but was able to play a dominant role in a deeply fractured parliament.
Recent protests throughout Shiite regions focused anger against these militias, which fre- quently responded with deadly force, making it almost a certainty that fewer Shiite voters would now cast ballots for pro-Iran sectarian elements.
Fresh elections could, therefore, benefit mod- erate Shiite factions and liberal cross-sectarian forces – if these entities get their act together.
Just like hezbollah, the hashd has displayed immense skill in infiltrating and corrupting every level of every government department. Disentangling and dismantling the hashd octo- pus will take years – brigade by brigade – per- haps starting with smaller criminal entities like Thar Allah, but ultimately moving on to the big- ger beasts.
There couldn’t be a better time to start than now, when the state coffers physically can’t afford to pay these parasites, which are preying upon the Iraqi body politic.
Al-Kadhimi’s tenure represents a window of opportunity for the Arab world and the West to re-engage with Iraq and empower moderate elements that could squeeze out the sectarian, Iran-allied factions in forthcoming elections.
Only Iraqis can win their country back. The protesters’ demands must be translated into a governing agenda that guarantees that Iraq’s vast wealth is not squandered on paramilitaries and advancing its Iranian neighbour’s hostile regional ambitions.
Starving and desperate citizens require lead- ers who inspire genuine hope and can re-cul- tivate national pride – irrespective of tribe, ethnicity or sect – by putting Iraqi identity first.™
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