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Opinion
August 31, 2018 www.intellinews.com I Page 24
COLCHIS:
Georgia’s security conundrum
Michael Cecire of New America
Ten years ago this month, Russia and Georgia fought a brief but ferocious war, which saw Russian forces openly cross international borders in anger for the first time since the Soviet era. Though broadly under-appreciated at the time, Moscow’s 2008 mili- tary adventure would come to be widely regarded as marking the return of an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, carrying over into conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, as well as in a broader, extended strategic showdown with the US and Europe.
The decennial of the Georgia-Russia war is a potent reminder of the tragic repercussions of that conflict, the seeming intractability of Western- Russia relations, as well as the uncomfortable limitations of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which did little to prevent the Georgia war or to attenuate Russian militarism in the years since. Euro-Atlantic institutions, and particularly Nato, have not effectively managed the widening corri- dor of Russia-involved security crises in the years since. Despite the impressive durability of Western engagement in Georgia, and the gratifying symbol- ism represented by multinational military exercises like the latest edition of Noble Partner, Georgia is as trapped as ever between Nato’s half-hearted overtures on one hand – enough to offer Georgians the faint facsimile of forward momentum, if only just – and the unforgiving strategic realities of the region, which ever-threaten the fragile stability Georgia has painstakingly won over the years.
In the pale moonlight
Put more bluntly, Georgia is unlikely to join Nato in the foreseeable future, no matter how much “pro- gress” it makes, given Nato’s acute internal divisions over the question of expansion. While expansion
Tending the graves of Georgian soldiers killed in the 2008 war with Russia at Tbilisi's Mukhatgverdi Cemetery.
should not be taken lightly, the Alliance’s growing categorical aversion to extending the frontiers of the liberal democratic space – albeit in the name of retrenchment – suggests an alliance increas- ingly unmoored from its founding values. This was a predictable recipe for crisis, and, unsurprisingly, the result today is a Nato whose identity, purpose, and unity is as unclear as it has ever been.
For Georgia and other Euro-Atlantic aspirant states, this presents a troubling proposition. An enthusiastic and dedicated Nato partner, Tbilisi’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic project has left it in a geopolitical halfway house, earning it the extended ire – and ma- lign attentions – from its powerful northern neigh- bour, but few tangible security benefits. It would not be an analytical stretch to surmise that Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation has been, thus far, a net se- curity negative. To be sure, this is only true because of Moscow’s insistent and varied predations, but it
is a strategic conundrum for which Nato or Western capitals have offered no clear solution.
Yet, ten years on from the 2008 war, Georgia’s outstanding strategic uncertainties and unrequited Euro-Atlantic affections are less the stuff of kitch- en table talk and more of grist for the foreign policy elite. In the most recent data from the Caucasus Barometer, the annual household survey conduct- ed by CRRC, support for Euro-Atlantic integration fails to register as one of the top issues faced by ordinary Georgians. While 67% profess to support- ing Nato integration, only 41% do so with few or no caveats, with 20% largely opposed. Of course, Nato to the average Georgian is a policy abstraction at best, and it’s entirely expected that national secu- rity and strategic questions would be subordinated