Page 63 - bneMag February 2021_20210202

bne February 2021 Eastern Europe I 63
The size of demonstrations on January 23 – 40,000 in Moscow alone according to Reuters and some 100,000 across the country according to reports – can already be called a huge success for Team Navalny.
But Navalny still has a limited appeal for the general public. Alekseev claimed that his cause has widespread support, but not enough people are willing to demonstrate to force the authorities to make a change. The last poll from the Levada Center puts Navalny's political support at around 2%, although his name recognition has clearly gone up now and the 50mn views of his “Putin’s Palace” video show he has caught the public’s attention.
In Belarus the weekend demonstrations regularly drew 100,000 people in
a country of only 10mn, but Navalny's protest drew the same number in
a country of 148mn. Protests in the Far East of Russia at the weekend are new, but protests in the European part of Russia, where 80% of the population live, were more muted. Still, even the smaller regional protests are significant, as protests are usually limited to Moscow and St Petersburg.
In contrast to Navalny, the opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya has a much cleaner profile and won the trust of her people easily. She was “just a
housewife”, and her motivation and her agenda were crystal clear: she stood
in the disputed August presidential elections because her husband was jailed and she demands only three things: Lukashenko should step down; the political prisoners should be released; and fresh elections should be held. She has said explicitly she has no aspiration to take power for herself, or even her husband. She just wants her life back.
On the other hand, most Russians assume that Navalny wants to become president if Putin leaves. One of the legacies of the Soviet system is most Russians don't understand how anyone can just stand up and say “I want to be president;” political leaders have to be in some way “qualified” for power, to have come from some sort of organ of state. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defence Minister Sergei Shoygu, far-right leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin all fare much better in trust polls than Navalny.
Despite a recent downturn in his popularity, Putin consistently outpolls Navalny by a wide margin, being trusted by 32% of respondents, and the preferred choice for president of 55%, according to the latest polls. However, Navalny did win 27% of the vote when he ran for mayor of Moscow in 2013 and nearly forced a second round of voting,
which suggests his real popularity may be a bit higher: people rank him low in the popularity polls not because they don't like him, but simply because they believe he has no chance
of ever being allowed to stand.
Another Levada poll taken in September, shortly after he was poisoned while campaigning in Siberia, asked respondents whether they approved of Navalny’s activities, a question only rarely posed in Levada’s polling. While 50% replied negatively, 20% said they did,
by far Navalny’s strongest ever result in a public poll, reports the Moscow Times.
As a result, Navalny’s protests are unlikely to go as far as those in Belarus. He has scored a huge victory with the size of the protests on January 23, and the protests are likely to continue at
a lower level, but not on the same scale as those across the border.
The Kremlin’s plan will be to contain these protests and try to avoid radicalising the population in the hope they will eventually fade away. But Navalny has succeeded in changing the game and the Kremlin will have
to prepare for sustained social unrest well into the summer, as Navalny probably has more tricks up his sleeve – putting his wife Yulia Navalnaya up
as a candidate for the Duma elections in September being the most obvious one.
Perm city, Russia – January 23, 2021: Unauthorized rally in support of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Photo: www.shutterstock.com
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