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officials. Its Secretariat, in general, has been closely associated with the Presidential Administration. The 2020 constitutional reform strengthened the State Council’s position in Russia’s constitutional system, albeit in an ambiguous way. Over the past years, it has gradually become an important discussion forum in the policymaking process in the phase before legislative initiatives are submitted to the State Duma and a channel of communication between the federal government and regional leaders.
Dyumin’s appointment is clearly a further promotion for the man whom many regard as one of Putin’s most trusted associates. Some even consider him a candidate for Putin’s successor. It should be noted, however, that the exact powers and duties of the State Council Secretary are only vaguely described. It is likely that Dyumin’s personal weight and closeness to Putin will lend influence to the position and allow him to shape it in a way that he prefers, rather than the other way around—similarly to how Nikolay Patrushev, who was recently dismissed as the Secretary of the Security Council, made his former position important due to his personal clout.
Two weeks prior to his appointment to the Secretariat of the State Council, Putin also appointed Dyumin to the supervisory board of Rostec, Russia’s state-owned technology giant and most important military supplier. This appointment is also significant at a time when ramping up military production has been elevated to the single most important short-term policy goal of the Kremlin.
Two governors resigned on May 30 and 31, continuing a wave of personnel changes in the regions. Natalya Komarova, the head of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District, one of Russia’s main oil-producing regions, left her post after 12 years. Komarova has been known for, among other things, her communications gaffes, including one in October last year where she told citizens at a public forum that “we don’t need [this war].” The Telegram channel “Baza” speculated that her dismissal may have to do with this and an alleged “discreditation of the army” case opened against her, although this is not confirmed. Her successor is Ruslan Kukharuk, the mayor of Tyumen. Both the Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets districts have a fiscal sharing agreement with the Tyumen oblast, and thus Kukharuk can be considered a local cadre. He is the fourth local to be made head of a region this year, breaking somewhat with the Kremlin’s earlier preference for “outsider” governors.
On Friday, Dmitry Azarov, the head of the Samara Region, resigned, which was somewhat surprising given that he was reelected for a second term only last year. Azarov’s term, however, has been riddled with corruptioninvestigations into his government and a conflict with the region’s powerful Duma deputy, Alexander Khinshtein. As in the case of Komarova, there are rumors about potential prosecution. His successor will be Vyacheslav Fedorishchev, until now the head of the government of the Tula Region—the region whose former governor, Alexey Dyumin, has just been promoted to
49 RUSSIA Country Report July 2024 www.intellinews.com