Page 55 - bne IntelliNews monthly magazine November 2024

bne November 2024
Opinion 55
serious practical considerations. All Russia's NSWS have
sat in armouries for the past 25 years and would need to be reconditioned before being mated to their delivery system. There would also almost certainly need to be a test detonation before any use in anger, and given that even the hypersonic Kindzhal, once touted as impossible to intercept, has proven vulnerable to Patriot air defence systems, Moscow would presumably have to launch multiple missiles to get through. That is, of course, assuming there was a viable target. Ukraine does not mass its forces in such a way to provide a logical target, while striking a city would be considered a massive escalation and an unjustifiable war crime across the world.
Instead, insofar as this latest edit of the doctrine has any serious meaning in the context of the Ukraine war, it may be preparing the ground for some post-ceasefire future. Moscow will presum- ably try to freeze its control of around a fifth of Ukraine, drawing
Kazakhstan’s Tokayev an authoritarian who has created “the illusion of change”, say analysts
bne IntelliNews
Kazakhstan’s Tokayev’s regime “has learned how to create the illusion of change while doing little of substance”, according to two analysts.
“Big ideas – like that of a ‘new Kazakhstan’– have turned out to be simply efforts to fill the vacuum left by years of political stagnation. Genuine reform would entail the introduction
of meaningful constraints on the power and privilege of Kazakhstan’s rulers. But the regime is obviously not ready for such a step,” write Aliya Tlegenova and Serik Beysembaev, in an assessment published by Carnegie Politika.
Despite his pledges of change, Kazakh president of five years standing Kassym-Jomart Tokayev increasingly appears to be “embracing the role of an authoritarian, patriarchal leader”, suggest Tlegenova – a researcher at Paperlab Research Center in Astana, Kazakhstan, and a political scientist who specialises on themes such as the politics of development, protests and civil society in Central Asia – and Beysembaev – director of Paperlab and an analyst who specialises on
out any negotiations which would in any case be unlikely to reach some resolution. If left in control of the Donbas, Crimea and the Zaporizhzhian 'land bridge' to the peninsula, Putin would likely be quite happy to take that as a win, even while reserving the option of resuming hostilities at some point in the future if the correlation of forces looked favourable.
In the meantime, he would want to deter any attempt by Kyiv to take back the occupied territories. Garrisons, trenches and minefields are all very well, but the prospect that Moscow might consider an attack by a US-backed Ukraine as potential grounds for a nuclear response might make Kyiv hesitate
but, rather more likely, will weigh on the minds of America's leaders, whoever they may be by then. The implications is that Moscow is seriously believing that a ceasefire may be on the horizon, whether because of US pressure or Ukrainian exhaustion.
Tokayev at his swearing-in ceremony in 2019.
governmental politics, public opinion and violent extremism prevention in Kazakhstan.
The dawning of 2022 marked a critical crossroads for Kazakhstan. The “Bloody January” civil unrest that spread across the country posed a serious threat to Tokayev’s hold on power. In response, he launched both a violent crackdown and a programme of reform.
“But little has actually changed in Kazakhstan,” say the two analysts. “As Tokayev has succeeded in consolidating his grip on power, he appears unafraid of tightening the screws even further. Society has descended into apathy that has been fostered by fear and disappointment.”
Tokayev was handpicked by his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had served as president for three decades since Kazakhstan gained its post-Soviet independence.
As noted by Tlegenova and Beysembaev, he only became
a powerful figure in his own right after the 2022 unrest,
www.bne.eu