Page 37 - bne IntelliNews monthly magazine September 2024

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by remaining on good terms with both the Russians and Ukrainians it could potentially serve as a mediator in any future efforts at ending the Ukraine war. However, located as it is at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia, Turkey is a past master at playing one side off against the other, profiting from its dealings with both sides in the process.
This is not the first time the US has grown irritated by Turkey’s trade in military- linked goods with Russia since the Rus- sian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
US Treasury under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence Brian Nelson made clear his frustration over the goods exports and re-exports when he visited Turkey in February and November last year.
Days after the February visit, amid sanctions tensions, there was a furious outburst from then Turkish interior minister Suleyman Soylu aimed at
US Ambassador to Ankara Jeffry
Flake, in which he said: “Take your dirty hands off of Turkey. I’m being very clear. I very well know how you would like to create strife in Turkey. Take your grinning face off from Turkey." Analysts saw the outburst as amounting to angry rhetoric that Soylu thought would play well ahead of national elections that were then fast approaching.
The US commerce department has so far placed 18 Turkish companies on its “entities list” over the trade, meaning American companies have to obtain rare licences to sell sensitive parts to the firms. Though there appears to have been some easing in flows to Russia from Turkey of military-connected goods since the highs recorded last year, a US commerce official told the
FT that “you can expect to see more of that going forward unless and until there is progress”.
In weighing up the extent of the problem, sanctions enforcement officials include assessments of what is referred
to as the “ghost trade”. This is made
up of goods that go missing and never arrive in the markets of their apparent destinations. In Turkey’s case, Turkish exports of sensitive goods are usually earmarked for dispatch to countries
in the South Caucasus or Central Asia, such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but then never turn up in the official import data of those countries. The usual suspicion, of course, is that the items have been moved on to Russia.
Late last year, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order under which his administration’s officials can
treat any foreign financial company transacting with a sanctioned Russian entity as if it is working directly with Russia’s military-industrial base. This appears to have brought some real progress in halting sanctions-busting trade with Russia, while also driving up costs Moscow must pay to access sensitive items, but the US is clearly still far from satisfied with the level of the impact on Russia’s war effort delivered by Western sanctions.
Balkan politicians eye Russia-style crackdown on NGOs with mooted ‘foreign agents’ laws
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Russia’s clampdown on non-gov- ernmental organisations (NGOs) has garnered increasing attention from politicians in Southeast Europe, with several countries in the region con- templating their own versions of Russia’s controversial "foreign agents" law.
This law, which has been widely criticised for suppressing opposition voices, has inspired politicians from Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia’s Republika Srpska to propose similar legislation in their respective countries.
Despite the widespread protests that erupted in Georgia after the adoption of a similar law in May 2023, which serves as a warning of the potential
backlash against such measures, Southeast European politicians appear undeterred.
Russian playbook
The legislation in Georgia was modeled after a similar law in Russia, initially adopted in 2012, which has since been expanded. The updated Russian law, passed in 2022, drastically broadens
the criteria for labeling individuals or organisations as ‘foreign agents’, casting an exceedingly wide net that includes virtually anyone engaged in civic activism or merely expressing opinions on Russian policies. The law also severely restricts the participation of ‘foreign agents’ in significant areas of public life, further tightening the Kremlin’s grip on dissent.
International human rights organisa- tions, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), have condemned these laws as attacks on free expression and legiti- mate civic activism. Rachel Denber, the deputy director for Europe and Central Asia at HRW, pointed out in 2022 that the Russian law has been used to "smear and punish independent voices”, equat- ing the term "foreign agent" in Russia to being labeled a "spy" or “traitor”.
Georgia follows suit
The law passed by the Georgian parliament requires media outlets
and non-governmental organisations receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as "pursuing
the interests of a foreign power." This
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