Page 4 - Caucasus Outlook 2024
P. 4

 Executive summary
     2023 was the year that Azerbaijan finally took over Nagorno-Karabakh, its dream since the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades ago.
In a surprise offensive in September, Baku’s forces attacked the ethnic Armenian enclave, forcing its de facto government to surrender after a day’s fighting. Subsequently, virtually the entire population of the disputed territory, more than 100,000 people, fled to Armenia.
To some extent the collapse of the statelet and the humanitarian tragedy of the refugee exodus should have been predictable after the rout of Armenian forces in the Second Karabakh war of 2020, which ended in an unstable Russian-mediated peace.
Since then Azerbaijan’s position has strengthened even further. Russia, the guarantor of the peace, has – on the most charitable view – been diverted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. More cynically, many observers argue it has in fact changed sides and has chosen to back the rising Azerbaijan, which is now much more important for its trade connections, given its routes westwards through Ukraine are now blocked. This has all given President Ilham Aliyev the freedom to flex his new economic and military muscles, and his alliance with a more and more assertive Turkey.
What was perhaps not so predictable was the way the international community sat on its hands. Azerbaijan’s growing importance as an energy producer has made Europe turn a blind eye to both Aliyev’s human rights abuses and his aggressive posturing. Despite some wringing of hands, Europe and the US did nothing significant to either restrain the Azerbaijani dictator from invading or protect the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh afterwards from being in effect ethnically cleansed.
Iran, which has tense relations with Baku, was also strangely quiet and quickly adapted to the new regional balance of power, which could also offer it some trade benefits if a corridor is built through its territory to connect Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The big question for 2024 is whether Aliyev will be content with his territorial gains. Baku continues to put pressure on Armenia for some kind of extra-territorial route to connect to its exclave of Nakhchivan and beyond to Turkey. It has also begun to repeat old claims to some villages inside Armenia proper, warning that until it is satisfied it will maintain some mountain positions on the disputed border that it has seized. Armenia fears this could all presage another attack. A full-scale invasion, however, looks unlikely, particularly in a year when Baku is hosting the COP29 environmental conference in November. Aliyev
 4 Central Asia & Caucasus Outlook 2021 www.intellinews.com
 

























































































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