Page 59 - bne IntelliNews monthly magazine April 2025
P. 59
bne April 2025
Opinion 59
Although the move by parliament espousing Armenia’s EU aspirations was not a surprise given the dramatic shift in public opinion in the country, the Armenian government is both more cautious and more realistic.
Despite the Armenian government’s pursuit of a more assertive strategy to “diversify” its security and foreign policy away from any reliance on Russia, there is still a pronounced degree of prudence and caution, driven by a more realistic assessment of Armenia’s options. The necessity for this Armenian caution in a more prudent policy stems from three factors.
Recognising Russia’s economic leverage
The first consideration that tends to temper Armenian aspirations is rooted less in security or foreign policy, but rather, in the significance of Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia. In this context, for much of 2024, it was Russia
that accounted for over 41% of Armenian foreign trade.
And compared to the 7.5% share of trade with the EU for
the same period, Armenian trade remains dominated by Russia, which was firmly the leading trading partner, with the bilateral Armenian-Russian trade volume surpassing $3bn in 2023. Beyond the trade statistics, for the average Armenian consumer, it is the subsidised price of Armenian imports
of Russian natural gas that exerts the greatest leverage of economic dependence on Russia.
This economic aspect of Russian leverage has only been matched by Armenian membership in the Russian- dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), which serves as an inherent impediment to Armenia’s economic and trade potential with the EU. In fact, Armenia’s membership in that Eurasian trade bloc actually precludes any Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU and legally prevents Armenian EU membership.
For all these reasons, the Pashinyan government feels appropriately cautious and carefully navigates its resistance of the gravitational pull from the Russian economic orbit.
Mounting challenges and meagre choices
The second factor limiting Armenia’s room to manoeuvre centres on its relations with Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Its geographic isolation in the South Caucasus, a region that has long served as an arena for confrontation for much larger powers, has left Armenia cut off from the West. Moreover, the simmering instability along Armenia’s borders has now become multiplied and magnified.
In this immediate neighbourhood, Armenia continues to be challenged by an unwelcoming and unrewarding geography. To the east, Armenia borders a recalcitrant Azerbaijan
eager to sustain conflict with Armenia and still refusing to prioritise diplomacy over force of arms. Looking westward, Turkey remains a neighbour reluctant to “normalise” relations with Armenia and whose military and diplomatic support for Azerbaijan has only impeded post-war stability.
Such an east-west axis of instability is further exacerbated by developments to the North and South. Armenia’s southern neighbour, Iran, is a particularly daunting partner, whose own isolation and destabilising interests have imposed severe limits on potential trade and cooperation. And to the north, recent developments in Georgia have greatly worried Armenia. Pursuing a pronounced policy of accommodating Russia while defying its own population, the Georgian leadership has contributed to an abrupt geopolitical recalculation.
This Georgian shift to an embrace of Russia and disdain for the West removes an important buffer for Armenia, which has no border with Russia. After several years of literally hiding behind Georgia, benefitting from the dividends
from Georgian aspirations to join both the EU and the Nato alliance, Armenia is now becoming much more exposed in its pivot to the West.
“Despite the Armenian government’s pursuit of a more assertive
strategy to “diversify” its security and foreign policy away from any reliance on Russia, there is still a pronounced degree of prudence and caution, driven by a more realistic assessment of Armenia’s options.”
Last man standing
Against that backdrop of the difficult geography of its immediate neighbourhood, Armenia faces an even more serious from a third trend, driven by a broader global realignment that started in Washington. This trend, marked by a sudden reversal of US foreign policy, poses an immediate danger for Armenia, as Washington is moving swiftly to embrace Moscow and encourage authoritarian power. This
is now increasingly evident in the Trump Administration’s aggressive turn against Ukraine. The danger for Armenia stems from its vulnerability as the sole remaining democracy in the South Caucasus.
And for Pashinyan, as a possible “sole survivor”, he is quickly becoming cursed as the “last man standing” in a region bereft of partners and beset by the proximity of authoritarian powers led by a resurgent Russia.
Richard Giragosian is the director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC), an independent think-tank in Armenia.
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