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fact that when the Department sought to make a change in the days-off groups involving Districts with a 4-2 schedule and was challenged by the Lodge, the Department negoti- ated which persuades this arbitrator that the Department, whether it was out of caution or otherwise, had acquiesced to a practice mutually accepted that could only be changed by negotiations.
Arbitrator Roumell sustained the grievance and went on to state: “Having concluded that there was a binding past practice as to day-off groups, it is recognized that in order to change a past practice, a change in the practice can, like any other con- tract, come about by negotiations and agreement.”
The key takeaway from the award, however, cannot be over- stated. At the very end of his award, Arbitrator Roumell reiter- ates an important point which the City seems to forget (empha- sis added):
The underlying change in conditions is the argument that 006 change day-off group reduction from the Department’s standpoint is part of the concept of unity of command and span of control set forth in the consent decree. However, Paragraph 711 of the consent decree is there to be read and essentially provides that “nothing in this consent decree is intended to (a) alter any of the CBAs between the City and the unions.” The ultimate point is if there is a desire to change the practice as to reducing the number of day-off groups, then this should be negotiated and agreed to be- tween the parties through the procedures for negotiating and reaching agreement under the CBA.
As mentioned in a prior article, the district court judge, in ad- dressing the consent decree and its limitations, professed sever-
al important observations which warrant repeating (emphasis added):
It is vitally important to call attention not only to what the consent decree is, but also to what it is not...Many of the reforms called for under the decree will need to be negotiated between the City and the unions representing CPD captains, lieutenants, sergeants and officers...
Both this court and the Seventh Circuit have acknowledged at least the potential for conflict between the decree and the CBA and state law. Nevertheless, the courts have agreed that “the Lodge’s rights are protected” on multiple levels... To begin, as noted above, the “carve-out language” express- ly confirms that “[n]othing in this consent decree shall be interpreted as obligating the City or the unions to violate... the terms of the CBAs...with respect to the subject of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment...
Among other things, “consent decrees ‘may not alter collec- tive bargaining agreements without the union’s assent.’”
If the parties try to interpret the decree in a way that the Lodge believes violates CBA rights, the Lodge can avail itself of normal remedies for CBA violations...As the court of ap- peals further explained, “[a]s things stand now, the consent decree cannot impair the CBA or state law rights enjoyed by Chicago Police Officers...
Arbitrator Roumell’s award, in essence, confirms the limita- tions of the consent decree and the City’s ongoing responsibility to bargain with Lodge 7. As always, Lodge 7 will ensure that the City complies with those obligations.
CHICAGO LODGE 7 ■ MARCH 2020 15