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situation—the weather—the terrain—, etc. By looking at a map and simply drawing a circle around a region of some tactical importance or reported enemy activity and then piece together a ‘task force’ of bastardized units to go in and ‘destroy’ the enemy! I witnessed one of these ‘strategic plans’ once in a staff meeting at Regimental HQ ( Fourth Marines ) Where the staff was explaining an upcoming operation they had been handed down by III MAF. We saw circles, arrows, boxes, numbers and later statistics—estimated friendly casualties—WIA and KIA and estimated enemy casualties as well—how much time it would take to secure the objective, etc. I noticed that the staff officers making the presentation were well fed—clean with shined boots, starched utilities, clean shaven and well rested. Their job was to give the orders —our job was to execute those orders. We would return to our respective battalions and begin the process of accumulating the data necessary to conduct the operation and disseminating a more detail plan to the company commanders designed by our Battalion Commander and his staff. The ‘rubber would meet the road’ when our troops actually had to implement those decisions made by others thousands of miles away and fight and die in some rice paddy in the mud while dodging enemy gunfire , sleeping in a hole and eating cold c-rations—all because some General or some politician willed it to be! We would confront our enemy—defeat that enemy—leave the area and the enemy —in greater numbers than before — would return to fight again. This was the legacy of this ‘war’—take terrain—give it back—fight and die to take it back again and on and on. I felt as if there were far too many ‘cooks in the kitchen’ and those cooks did not appear to know what
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