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Company Commanders were livid—as they should have been and as was I. If we couldn’t find the maps then 1/4 would be flying into a battle zone blind—It was imperative that they would be able to identify terrain features, streams, villages and other terrain features and these were an essential tool for calling in artillery and air support! The Col. was upset about this and promised that we would indeed get those maps forthwith—he looked at me and said that’s job no. one Lieutenant—get on it! Everyone on the Col.’s staff turned to and called surrounding outfits, division HQ, III MAF HQ and gradually over the next 24hrs. we were able to scrounge enough maps for the Col., the company commanders, support units, etc. to mount the operation. Combat situations normally develop around the movement of enemy units —so Intelligence and operations people operate in a very fluid, developing situation. Having maps of every Region of the Country immediately available in large quantities for distribution wasn’t feasible in 1966. Often, we would have maybe two or three days after being given an Operational Order for the Battalion to mount out—the challenge was to provide what the troops would need for each operation on short notice.
Sometime between Mar. 15th and Mar. 16th. Col. Sullivan decided on the location of the LZ’s. @47This would be a helicopter assault with Companies A and B. On Mar. 18th Col. Sullivan received the ‘deployment orders’ which directed him to have the Battalion ( minus ) ready for boarding the choppers early on the 19 th. of Mar. This would be a ‘Task Force’ operation with Col. T.F. Fisher commanding. The ‘Task ‘ organization included H& S Co., 81mm mortar platoon,
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